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PERSONIFICATION

AND THE

USE OF ABSTRACT SUBJECTS IN THE
ATTIC ORATORS AND THUKYDIDES

PART I

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE BOARD OF UNIVERSITY STUDIES OF THE
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

ROBERT SOMERVILLE RADFORD

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1901



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¹ This work is cited simply as Hense.

PERSONIFICATION¹ AND THE USE OF ABSTRACT SUBJECTS IN THE ATTIC ORATORS AND THUKYDIDES.

INTRODUCTION.

The use of simple concrete terms is the rule in the classical languages; abstract words and phrases are far more usual in modern English. When an abstract noun is employed in Greek or Latin, it adds dignity to the style, and if an abstract subject is employed with a verb of action, the effect is still more marked. The reason for this is that originally when non-personal subjects were associated with verbs of action, personification was always involved². This vivid conception is commonly lost in the later stages of

¹ In the present title Personification is employed in a restricted sense and used to include only those cases in which non-personal subjects are associated with verbs of action. For this use of the term, cf. Meyer, l. l., p. 3. The cases are excluded in which adjectives which are properly used only of persons are applied metaphorically to things. Similarly the term 'abstract' subject is often employed in the general sense of 'non-personal.'

² Usener, *Götternamen*, p. 371 ff., holds that the earliest stratum of Greek abstract nouns, viz., the feminines of the a-declension, did not originally possess an abstract meaning, but are old feminine forms which correspond to the nomina agentis in -ός, ἡ τροφή, 'nourishment,' being really the feminine of an original adjective τροφός-η-όν, 'nourishing.' The feminine adjective has become an abstract noun through first denoting some female personality, which in the oldest time was that of some divine being. This view, which Usener seeks to support by some precise philological data, is substantially the same as that formerly advocated on more general grounds by Max Müller (*Chips from a German Workshop*, II 56 ff.) According to the latter, the old enlivening and individualizing forms of expression live on in poetry. According to the well-known view of J. Grimm, *Deutsche Grammm.* III, p. 344 ff., personification lies at the basis of all grammatical gender, since the earliest stages of language uniformly attributed personal actions and qualities to things.

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language, yet, as Prof. Gildersleeve (A. J. P., XX, 111) points out in discussing the *σεμνότης* of abstract nouns, 'the nominative of the abstract is apt to hark back to the primal personification.'

The use of non-personal subjects has been hitherto examined chiefly for Latin authors. Nägelsbach's discussion of Latin usage in his *Lateinische Stilistik*, p. 570 ff., is a standard one, and the main outlines of his treatment may be briefly reproduced here. Nägelsbach treats the use of subjects of the thing as involving the elevation of the thing to the dignity of a person, in other words, the personification of the thing, and as restricted largely to special styles and kinds of composition. This personification, according to Nägelsbach, is akin, on the whole, to the poetical fancy, but there are certain spheres of writing in which no prose author has refrained from its use. Hence he distinguishes four classes of abstract subjects which are freely associated with verbs of action :—

(1) An affection or disposition of the mind stands out so prominently that it appears to be the real agent and to play the part of the person, as Liv. 21, 8 *hinc spes, hinc desperatio animos irritat*.

(2) Abstract substantives may designate actions so weighty and important in themselves that in our thought they are detached from the acting person and become independent, as Cic. ad Att. 12, 16 fin. *me scriptio et litterae non leniunt, sed obturbant*.

(3) This personification finds its proper sphere especially in political and scientific language, as Cic. Ac. 2, 3, 7 *neque nostrae disputationes quidquam aliud agunt, nisi ut eliciant*, etc.

(4) Here belong also the arts and sciences conceived as independent of those who pursue them, as Cic. Fin. 3, 2, 4 *agricultura eas res nominibus notavit novis*.

More recently the question of the Latin use of abstract subjects has received extended treatment in a number of special dissertations, which are enumerated in Nägelsbach, l. l., p. 572. Of these only two require mention here, viz., the dissertation of Ahlén, *De subiectis rei apud Ciceronem cum verbis, quae actionem significant, coniunctis*, Upsala, 1877, and that of Bock, *Subiecta rei cum actionis verbis coniungendi usus*, Leipzig, 1889. Ahlén has collected the examples of subjects of the thing used by Cicero and arranged them into classes according to the several verbs with which they occur. Bock, on the other hand, has divided the material collected by Ahlén as well as that added by himself into

seven classes, based largely on the four classes of Nägelsbach. The examples occurring in Cicero have been shown by Ahlén's collection to be so numerous that they have led grammarians to recognize a larger use of abstract subjects in Latin than was formerly admitted (Nägelsbach-Müller, l. l., p. 567); yet the frequency of this use in the Roman writer must also be ascribed in part to the luxuriant and rhetorical qualities of Ciceronian style.

No special examination has hitherto been made of the Greek use of abstract subjects, although a collection of examples appears

Method of
Procedure. to show that the usage of many Greek authors in this respect is more moderate than that of any Latin author. In the present dissertation I shall

attempt to supply this omission by collecting the various uses of non-personal subjects with verbs of action, which are found in the genuine works of the Attic Orators and in Thukydides, and by pointing out, so far as possible, their stylistic effect. In determining the question of genuineness I have followed the judgment of Blass; of the doubtful speeches only the Epitaphios ascribed to Lysias has been included in view of its special interest. The arrangement of the material offers some difficulty. Ahlén has arranged his examples according to verbs, Bock according to subjects. The arrangement which I shall adopt will be an attempt to combine, so far as possible, the chief advantages of both these methods. Hence I shall first arrange the following classes according to subjects (Part I):—

(1) Natural objects or phenomena in which the force of nature seems to act, as Thuk. 4, 3, *ἡ χειμῶν ἐπιγενόμενος κατήνεγκε τὰς ναῦς ἐς τὴν Πύλον*.

(2) Phrases and forms of expression which belong to popular or to technical language, i. e., the language of special classes or professions, as Dem. 19, 44 *ταῦτα λέγει ἡ ἐπιστολή; νόμος λέγει, κελεύει*, etc.; Isokr. 2, 42 *τὰ συμβουλευόντα τῶν συγγραμμάτων*.—The association of verbs with subjects which fall under this class is, in general, no more restricted than in a modern language, often it is less restricted.

(3) Cases in which the actions or affections of persons are consciously ascribed to inanimate things (Personification Proper), as Dem. 18, 172 *ἐκεῖνος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη εὐνοῦν ἄνδρα ἐκάλει*. It will be observed that only those cases of personification are included under the present class in which the individual writer

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aims at bold and vivid imagery. The cases in which the popular or scientific language freely employs personification (*νόμος*, *λόγος*, etc.) fall under the preceding class.

(4) Cases in which the part of the person is ascribed to some leading quality or characteristic of the person (Periphrasis), as Dem. 36, 60 *μηδ' ὑμᾶς ἡ τούτου ἀναλθεια ἐξαπατήσῃ*.

These last two classes of abstract subjects are closely related to each other and together represent the rhetorical use. They belong properly to imaginative or impassioned language, and from the nature of the case there is little restriction upon the verb employed.

The examples of abstract subjects which remain after these deductions have been made are of a milder character and represent chiefly the formal side of the use. The greater number still belong to more elevated language, but many, especially in connection with certain classes of verbs, have become thoroughly trite. All such examples may be most conveniently arranged according to verbs, with a view to showing the classes of verbs which are most frequent in this use (Part II).

It need scarcely be said that by the term 'verbs of action' I understand with Bock (p. 7) verbs expressing voluntary actions, such as a person is accustomed to perform of his own free will and accord. Yet the treatment of abstract subjects requires to be extended to include all verbs which are more properly employed of persons and are used of things only by a species of metaphor. These latter are sometimes verbs which express a state or condition, as *ισχύειν*, *δύνασθαι*; sometimes verbs which are applicable only to living beings as such, e. g., *γηράσκειν*, *ἀποθνήσκειν*.

SUMMARY OF USAGE.

In seeking to estimate the general effect of this construction, it is necessary first to set aside the usage of technical writers on the arts and sciences, who are chiefly concerned with things, not with persons, and consequently neglect the distinction observed in the purely literary language. Secondly, the examples collected in Part II of the present dissertation show clearly that abstract subjects have become quite usual with certain classes of verbs.¹

¹ These are chiefly verbs of motion, verbs of showing, of harming and helping, of grieving, of needing, of availing and being strong, of making and causing.

Finally, an exception must be made also for many familiar concrete objects which belong to the sphere of every-day life. Cases of the full personification of abstracts remain, and also the general mass of less vivid uses. These two classes, the more and the less forcible, are intimately connected; the frequent use of the one in any author implies the frequent use of the other. The construction as a whole appears to be a species of semi-personification, which has been introduced chiefly from epic and tragic poetry, and which flourishes in the more elevated styles. A poetical color, a rhetorical warmth remains, which has largely faded out in English. This can best be seen from a statistical table, giving the whole use of non-personal subjects in the Orators, Herodotos and Thukydidēs.

	Non-Personal Subjects.	Teubner pages.	Proportion.
Sophokles (Oid. T., Antig.) . . .	137	96	1.43 ¹
Antiphon (Tetralogies, Or. I). . .	38	32	1.19
Thukydidēs (Speeches).	113	123	.92
Herodotos (Bk. VII).	75	105	.71
Antiphon (All).	49	70	.70
Isokrates (Non-forensic Works) . .	255	437	.58
Thukydidēs (All).	310	601	.52
Lykurgos	23	45	.51
Aischines	86	189	.46
Deinarchos	19	45	.42
Demosthenes (All, acc. to Blass) .	293	743	.39
Hypereides	18		
Demosthenes (Private Speeches) .	35	130	.27
Isokrates (Forensic Speeches). . .	14	65	.22
Andokides	7	50	.14
Isaios	17	145	.12
Lysias.	21	187	.11

In estimating the number of examples of each author I have omitted a few colorless and inevitable phrases for which there are no other expressions, viz., verbs of motion used of time, revenues and supplies (*προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου, φοιτᾶν σίτον*), verbs of saying and decreeing in technical phrases, where they involve no metaphor (*ψήφισμα λέγει, κελεύει*), finally all cases of *τύχη* and of *νόμος*.

¹ This ratio would be considerably greater if the difference between the Teubner page in prose and poetry had been taken into account. The ratio of the dialogue falls slightly below that of the *ῥήσεις* and the choruses.

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Absolute accuracy is not claimed for these results, but it is not believed that the final ratio would vary very greatly as the result of a somewhat different method of counting.

The most significant fact revealed by these statistics is that the masters of the plain style, Lysias and Isaïos, are extremely sparing in their use of abstract subjects. Their ratio is about one-half that of the private speeches of Isokrates and Demosthenes, and little more than one-fourth the general average of Demosthenes. The reserve of Lysias¹ in this respect is even more remarkable than that of Isaïos who has only private speeches, and is to be attributed to the extreme simplicity, the *ισχνότης* of his style. Andokides also shows a low ratio since he represents the conversational language and possesses little rhetorical culture.² On the other hand, the place of Antiphon and Thukydides at the head of the column represents the grave and elaborate style which admits bold imagery and poetic ornament. Somewhat different is the meaning of the large average in Demosthenes, which is intimately connected with the orator's vigor and sustained intensity. Aischines has an average apparently a trifle higher than Demosthenes, but this is due to the fact that he has no private speeches. Here too the large use answers to oratorical power, but also to poetical excess. It is difficult to compare Isokrates' use directly with that of the other orators; his professional treatment of rhetoric, philosophy and politics causes him to employ much of the freedom of technical language, but his high average is also due to his ornate and copious style; he is, however, far from showing the boldness and variety that is found in Demosthenes and Aischines.

It may be noted that Demosthenes' average is highest in the wonderfully vehement and passionate speech on the False Embassy (XIX), where it rises to nearly .70; in the speech on the Crown the average is about .50. In Aischines the highest average naturally is in the Ktesiphontea (.50). Lysias has his highest average in the speech against Agoratos (.20), but the examples are all connected with the legal language.

The usage of Demosthenes is of such importance that a further

¹ Cf. especially Frohberger-Gebauer, *Proleg. Anm.* 74, and note on *Lys.* 14, 18 (Leipzig, 1880).

² It is interesting to note that Andokides, Isaïos and Lysias take a similarly low rank in respect also to the use of the articular inf., see Prof. Gildersleeve, *A. J. P.*, VIII, 332.

analysis of it may be offered. Demosthenes undoubtedly stands first among the orators in the boldness and vividness of the images which he associates with abstract subjects, yet it is by the judicious use of very simple materials that he has produced his striking effects. No one, we may say, who has used so many subjects of the thing has used so few that are noticeably abstract. Thus phrases in which the abstract subject is made more complex by having a second abstract dependent upon it as genitive or prepositional phrase are extremely rare in Demosthenes; such a subject as τὸ τῆς φύσεως βάρβαρον (21,150) is very exceptional. On the other hand, these complex phrases are frequent in Thuk., Ant., Isokr. and Aisch., as Isokr. Ep. 8, 5 αἱ περὶ τὴν βώμην δυνάμεις; Aisch. 2, 64 ἡ τῆς αἰτίας ἀπιθανότης; 3, 60. 155. 280. Again by a free use of the articular infinitive as subject Demosthenes was able to avoid the unusual abstract nouns which are of such frequent occurrence in Thuk., as 4, 85, 1 ἡ ἐκπεμφίς μου; on these latter see Sihler, Verbal Nouns in -σις in Thuk., Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc., XII, 101. Thus in the place of the *ισότης* of Isokrates he employs τὸ πάντα ἔχειν ἴσον ἀλλήλοις (19,108), and in the case of many short phrases (τὸ εὐτυχεῖν, τὸ ἀφείναι) he appears to reduce somewhat the *σεμνότης* of the abstract expression.¹ In other cases he uses this infinitive, on the analogy of an abstract noun, with the utmost boldness, as 19, 289 οὐ δέδοικα εἰ Φίλιππος ζῇ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῆς πόλεως τέθνηκε τὸ τοὺς ἀδικούντας μισεῖν; ib. 210. Demosthenes has in all 19 examples of the articular inf. in this use, Isokr. comes next with 8, the rest have not more than one or two each. Again, Demosthenes is especially fond of summing up a previous thought by the neuter demonstratives, τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο (also *δπερ*), which he places in emphatic positions and uses to fix the attention of the hearer upon a desired point. These pronouns form nearly one-sixth of the whole number of impersonal subjects occurring in Dem. (47 examples). This use of the neuter demonstrative is foreign to a milder orator like Lysias, but is found also in Isokrates and in the lively dialogue of Aristophanes.

The Greek abstract subject is far more often than in modern

¹ On the stylistic effect of the articular inf., see Prof. Gildersleeve, A. J. P., XX, 111: 'The abstract noun does not go into details, has less sympathy and therefore more true *σεμνότης* than the articular inf., which I have compared somewhere to a tribune of the people, an upstart vulgarian of whom it may be said *ὡς σεμνὸς ὁ κατάρτος*.' Cf., further, ib. VIII, 33.

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English a conscious metaphor, a figure of rhetoric, a mode of pathos or *êthos*. The difference may be best illustrated by examining examples from Lysias and Isaios. Thus in the dramatic scene in which Diogeiton's daughter upbraids her father for his cruelty, she is represented by Lysias as saying that 'the crushing weight of her misfortunes compels her to speak in the presence of strangers' (Lys. 32, 11 τὸ μέγεθος αὐτὴν ἀναγκάσει τῶν συμφορῶν δηλῶσαι πάντα). Lysias here seeks to fit his style to the pathos of the situation, and to strike a note deeper and more resonant than that of the simplest prose. Without being strictly tragic, the language employed might with propriety be put in the mouth of an heroine of tragedy, e. g., Eur. Hel. 593 τοῦκεῖ με μέγεθος τῶν πόνων πείθει, σὸ δ' οὐ. The effect is a slight one, and easily capable of being overestimated, but the general tendency can scarcely be doubted. For the language of pathos, cf. also Isai. 2, 12; And. 2, 10. Again, Lysias writes, 19, 39: ὁ Κόνωνος θάνατος καὶ αἱ διαθῆκαι σαφῶς ἐδήλωσαν ὅτι κτέ. (cf. ib. 52 ὁ δ' ἀποθανὼν ἐδήλωσεν). Verbs of showing with non-personal subjects have become largely naturalized in prose, but it is probable that an artist like Lysias here aimed at some special effect and used the present turn as a conscious extension of the familiar idiom, τὸ ἔργον αὐτὸ ἐδήλωσε, 'the upshot, the result showed'; hence here 'Konon's death and will showed conclusively, proved to evidence, that he possessed a much smaller fortune than was commonly believed'. We find in Isaios, 6, 18: Εὐκτῆμων μὲν ἐβίω ἔτη ἐνενήκοντα, . . . ἐπὶ γῆρως δὲ αὐτῷ συμφορὰ ἐγένετο οὐ μικρά, ἣ ἐκείνου πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκίαν ἐλυμήνατο καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ διώλεσε κτέ. ('In his advanced age Euktemon met with no small calamity, which threw his whole family into disorder, consumed a great part of his estate, etc.'—Sir W. Jones). We are not surprised to find that the misfortune, thus gravely prefaced, has been the occasion of the lawsuit and constitutes the central point of the controversy. The tone is essentially the same as when Telemachos complains of the lawlessness of the suitors (Od. β, 48 f. (καχὸν) δ δὴ τάχα οἶκον—διαρραΐσει—δλέσσει), or when Strepsiades laments the spendthrift habits of his son (Ar. Nub. 26 τοῦτι τὸ καχὸν δ μ' ἀπολώλεκεν). Yet even in the simplest prose a few cases of abstract subjects occur which come very near the faded modern use, as Isai. 7, 13 τὸ γὰρ μέγεθος τῶν δικῶν ἐπιφάνειάν τινα ἐποίησεν; so with the neuter adjective as subject, e. g. Lys. 32, 21 οὐχ ἥττον τὰ μικρὰ λυπεῖ.

It is obvious from a comparison of Antiphon's Tetralogies with the comparative moderation of the speeches actually delivered (1.19: .29) that the heaping up of abstract subjects belonged to fine writing, and was borrowed, along with other ornamental figures, from the poets and the Gorgian rhetoric. Similarly the speeches attributed to Gorgias himself abound in poetical and fanciful personifications at every turn. Hence the abstract subject and poetical diction are often found together, as Ant. 1, 13 *δίκη δὲ κυβερνήσειεν* (Blass I, p. 130); And. 3, 7 *ἡ εἰρήνη τὸν δῆμον ὁψηλὸν ἦρε*; Hyp. 6, 25; Hdt. 7, 12 init. In the statement of commonplaces and general truths the abstract subject often gives a somewhat stilted and pompous effect. A very neat example is afforded by the prosy speech of the Epops, Ar. Av. 376 f., *ἀπ' ἐχθρῶν δῆτα πολλὰ μανθάνουσιν οἱ σοφοί. | ἡ γὰρ ἐδράβεια σφῆζει πάντα*, and by the sophistic speech of Pólos in the opening scene of the Gorgias, Pl. Gorg. 448, c *ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην*. Similarly Aristophanes evidently parodies the tragic style in Lysistrata's speech (Lys. 708 f.), and Demosthenes (18, 35) in ridiculing the solemn phrases of Aischines, probably means to include the use of the abstract subject; see Weil's note.

Finally the effect may be noted of associating purely concrete nouns with verbs which are properly used of persons. Thus

The Verb
πάσχειν.

Aristeides (Rhet. Gr. Sp. II 544) praises the diction of Demosthenes 55, 24: 'a jar of wine had been overturned, she said, but it had suffered no injury (*οὐ μέντοι παθεῖν γε οὐδέεν*)', and observes that the literal meaning would have been expressed by saying that 'the oil had not been spilled (*ἐχχυθῆναι γε*)'. Yet the latter would have been a trivial term, not rising above the level of common life, and Demosthenes has made a great gain in dignity by substituting the more general term *παθεῖν*. While the dignity of the passage is attributed by Aristeides to the use of *παθεῖν* as the more general word, it seems safe to conclude that it is also due in part to the personifying effect of *παθεῖν*. This use of *πάσχειν* is quite rare when the verb retains its full meaning, as again in this oration, § 25, 8 (sc. *τειχίον*) *μήτ' ἔπεσε μήτ' ἄλλο δεινὸν μηδὲν ἔπαθεν*; ib. 20 (*τὸ χωρίον*); [56], 23 (*ἡ ναῦς*); Thuk. 1, 121, 3 (*ἡ ἡμετέρα δύναμις*); Pl. Phaidr. 241, e *ὁ μῦθος, ὃ τι πάσχειν προσήκει αὐτῷ, τοῦτο πείσεται*. This effect is very largely lost when *πάσχειν* has the trite meaning 'be the case with, be the way with', chiefly in periphrases for the

person, as Ar. Nub. 234 *πάσχει δὲ ταῦτ' οὗτο καὶ τὰ κάρδαμα*; id. Pl. 551 (*οὐμὸς βίος*); Isokr. 13, 12 (*τὸ τῶν λόγων*); Arist. Rhet. 3, 2, 1404, b. A similar elevated tone may safely be attributed to *πονεῖν*, used of inanimate things, as Dem. 18, 194 *πονησάντων αὐτῷ τῶν σκευῶν ἢ καὶ συντριβέντων ὄλως*; Th. 7, 38 (*ἡ ναῦς*); perhaps also to *κινδυνεύειν*, used of money or property, as Isokr. 17, 36 *εἰ μὴ κινδυνεύοι τὰ χρήματα*; Dem. 30, 16 (*ἡ προίξ*); 28, 1 (*ὁ οἶκος*). For a similar effect through the association both of concrete and of abstract subjects with verbs commonly used of persons, see especially under *ᾠφελεῖν*, *ἐναντιοῦσθαι* and *τυγχάνειν*, Part II.

CLASS I.

NATURAL OBJECTS AND FORCES.

Natural phenomena, such as the earth, the sea, the rivers, the winds and the like, were originally conceived by the Greeks as divine beings endowed with personal agency, as we may see in the mythological personification of the river Skamandros in Homer, *ᾧ* 212 ff. This mythological conception does not disappear altogether from the general Greek consciousness in historical times, but is apt to recur on great occasions, at least, in writers of the mythical or theological tendency. Thus Herodotos does not think it altogether incredible that the hurricane which overtook the Persian fleet off Magnesia was in reality the god Boreas, coming to the assistance of the Athenians in answer to their prayers (*Hdt.* 7, 189). Compare also 178, *καὶ σφι ἐχρήσθη ἀνέμοισι εἶχεσθαι· μεγάλους γὰρ τούτους ἔσεσθαι τῇ Ἑλλάδι συμμάχους*; ib. 191, and, for the personification of the winds, see Welcker, Gr. Götterl. I, 707; Preller, Gr. Myth. I, 386 ff. Similarly the Greeks of historical times honored their chief rivers as divine beings with shrines and sacrifices, see Welcker, I, 652 f.; Preller, I, 447 f.; A. Gerber, *Naturpersonif.*, JJ. Suppl. Bd. XIII, 269 ff.

Viewed then as divine persons, the great powers of nature are constantly associated by the early Greeks with verbs of action; thus in Homer *νόξ*, *ἡμέρη*, *πῦρ*, *χειμῶν*, *ἄνεμος*, *θύελλα*, *πόντος*, *κῦμα*, etc. The later conception which saw the operations of Nature in all external phenomena, was almost equally favorable to their free use as agents. Since these natural objects were viewed as efficient causes and active forces, it was as customary to place them as subjects in Greek as it is in any modern language (cf. Bock, l. 1., p. 30). The preceding remarks relate wholly to

natural objects conceived as divine powers or as natural agents; quite different is the poetical species of personification which attributes human actions and passions to inanimate objects in nature (see below under Personification, I).

With the exception of a single speech of Demosthenes, which deals with the obstruction of a water-course (Or. LV), there is little occasion in the orators for the use of these subjects, but they occur frequently in the historians. It will be sufficient, in illustration of this whole class, to cite a few of the bolder uses in full and give only references for the remainder: Dem. 55, 11 ἐμβάλδν τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ τε χωρία ἐλυμήνατο καὶ μᾶλλον ὠδοποιεῖ; ib. 30 πάλιν τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν ἤξει χωρίον, εἴτα καταβαλεῖ τὴν αἵμασιάν; Th. 2, 77, 6 λέγεται ὕδωρ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πολλὸν (γενόμενον) σβέσαι τὴν φλόγα; 55, 1 (τὴν γῆν), ἣ πρὸς Πελοπόννησον ὕρᾳ; 3, 89, 2 ἡ θάλασσα ἐπῆλθε τῆς πόλεως μέρος τι καὶ ἀνθρώπους διέφθειρεν κτέ.; Xen. Hell. 1, 7, 6 (οὐκ) αὐτοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ πωλῦσαν; Th. 3, 49, 4 πνεύματος οὐδενὸς ἐναντιωθέντος (Personification); 2, 77, 4 (τὸ πῦρ) τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς ἐλαχίστου ἐδέησε διαφθεῖραι; 2, 12, 3 ἥδε ἡ ἡμέρα τοῖς Ἕλλησι μεγάλων κακῶν ἄρξει; Dem. 18, 296 ἐπιλείψει με λέγοντα ἡ ἡμέρα. The following phrases with νύξ are apparently semi-poetical: Th. 3, 72, 3 ἀφικομένης νυκτός (for the usual νύξ ἐπεγένετο, see Classen on 3, 112, 1); 4, 129, 5 νυκτὸς ἐπελθούσης; 96, 8 ν. ἐπιλαβούσης τὸ ἔργον (commonly, as 4, 25, 2 ν. ἐπεγένετο τῷ ἔργῳ); 134, 2 ἀφελομένης τῆς ν. τὸ ἔργον; cf. Xen. Hell. 1, 2, 16.

The whole use of this class may be arranged according to subjects as follows: γῆ, χώρα: Th. 3, 23, 5; Aisch. 3, 110; Isokr. 7, 74; 8, 94; 11, 12; 4, 109; Th. 5, 64, 4; 2, 55, 1. Ἑλλάς, ἡ Ἀττική: Dem. 9, 27 (χωρεῖ); id. frgm. 16. νῆσος, ἄκρα: Th. 4, 8, 6; 29, 3; 7, 4, 4; cf. 2, 93. θάλασσα: Th. 3, 89, 2; 1, 120, 2; Dem. 9, 70. ἐπίκλυσις: Th. 3, 89, 3. ὕδωρ, ὑετός: Dem. 55, 11. 17. 20. 30; Th. 8, 42, 1; 2, 5, 2. 77, 6; 4, 75; 5, 65, 4. χειμῶν: Th. 4, 3, 1. 6, 1. 27, 1; Xen. Hell. 1, 6, 35. 7, 6; Hdt. 7, 34. 170. 188. ἄνεμος, πνεῦμα, πνοή: Th. 1, 54, 1; 2, 93, 4. 94, 1; 3, 49, 4; 2, 25, 4. 84, 3; 6, 2, 4; 4, 100, 4. ποταμός: Th. 2, 102, 2. 3; 1, 46, 4; Hdt. 2, 14. Νεῖλος: Isokr. 11, 13. πῦρ: Th. 2, 77, 4; 3, 116, 1 (ρύαξ). σεισμός: Th. 1, 23, 3; 3, 89, 2. 84, 4. For the mythological conception, cf. Ar. Lys. 1142 ὕμιν ἐπέχειτο ὁ θεὸς σείων. ἥλιος: Hyp. 6, 5; Hdt. 7, 8 f.; Th. 2, 28. ἡμέρα: Dem. 18, 296; Isokr. 6, 81; 8, 56; Aisch. 2, 126; Th. 4, 118, 12; 2, 12, 3; Xen. Hell. 2, 2, 23; Ar. Pax 435; Plut. Lys. 15. νύξ: Th. 3, 23, 5; 7, 87, 1; 3, 72, 3; 4, 129, 5. 96, 8. 134, 2; Xen. Hell. 1, 2, 16.

CLASS II.

POPULAR AND TECHNICAL LANGUAGE.

It is important to recognize fully the large influence of the language of special classes and professions upon the use of non-personal subjects; see the remarks of Bock, p. 39, Class IV. The large extension of this use may be seen in any scientific work which deals with technical subjects. This special use, so far as it appears in Thukydides and the orators, will be examined under three heads:—

(1) The popular language, illustrated chiefly by the familiar concrete terms which it employs, often with a species of homely personification.

(2) The legal language seen in the free use of νόμος and similar juridical terms.

(3) The learned language occupied with questions of government, literature, philosophy and education, and represented, among the orators, chiefly by Isokrates.

Concrete substantives, the names of objects belonging to the uses of daily life, are freely placed as subjects throughout the Greek language. This use occurs most naturally

I. The Popular Language.

in the special language of the various arts and professions, but soon passes over in part into the common literary language, where it is often enlarged and extended under the influence of analogy. The orators have few occasions to dwell at length upon the familiar objects of common life, and their language affords no such wide exemplification of this use as we find, for example, in the comedies of Aristophanes. The examples which occur may be divided as follows:—

(a) In Thukydides the concrete substantives mentioned belong chiefly, though not exclusively, to the military language. Thus we find the various implements and engines of war placed as subjects: Th. 2, 76, 4 (*μηχανήν*), ἡ τοῦ οἰκοδομήματος ἐπὶ μέγα τε κατέσεισε καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς ἐφόβησεν; 77, 1 ὡς αἱ μηχαναὶ οὐδὲν ὠφέλουν; 76, 4 (*δοκός*); 3, 22, 4 (*περαμῖς*); 7, 65, 2 (*χεῖρ*), cf. 62, 3; —or fortifications, buildings and the like: 4, 115, 3 τὸ δὲ οἷκημα κατερράγη καὶ τοὺς ἐγγὺς ἐλύπησε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐφόβησεν; 6, 66, 1 (*τείχια καὶ οἰκίαι*); [Lys.] 2, 45 (*τεῖχος*). Similar subjects in Thukydides are the following: 4, 34, 3 (*πίλος*); 2, 75, 2 (*λίθοι καὶ ἐν τι ἄλλο*); 1, 93, 5 and 2, 34, 3 (*ἄμαξα*); cf. Hyp. 2, 5 (*ζεύγος*). It is

needless to say that this use varies largely with the style of the author. Several of the constructions just quoted from Thukydides are free and bold; still more striking is the personification in the following: 4, 100, 1 ἄλλω τε τρόπῳ πειράσαντες καὶ μηχανὴν προσήγαγον, ἥπερ εἶλεν αὐτό (sc. τὸ τεῖχος), ('finally they brought up an engine of war which took the fort, effected its capture'). Here Krüger wished to avoid the personification of μηχανή by writing ἥπερ εἶλον, but Classen is right in maintaining that the construction is in keeping with the general boldness of Thukydides' manner; cf. also 8, 91, 1 φάσων κινδυνεύσειν τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο καὶ τὴν πόλιν διαφθεῖραι.

(b) Concrete substantives are comparatively rare in the orators; compare, however, Dem. 55, 19 and Th. 3, 107, 3 (χαράδρα); Aisch. 1, 123 (τὰ οἰκήματα). In the language of business and trade we find the following: Aisch. 3, 173 νῦν μέντοι τὸ βασιλικὸν χρυσίον ἐπιτέκλυε τὴν δαπάνην αὐτοῦ ('a flood of Persian gold has washed away all traces of his extravagance'); Dem. 14, 20 ὅπως τὴν μὲν δαπάνην ἐξήχοντα τάλαντα συντελῇ, . . . εἴκοσι μὲν ἢ τάλαντα τὴν δαπάνην διαλύοντα ('make up, liquidate the whole expense');¹ 45, 33 δι' ὃν ὠφειλῇ τοσαῦτα χρήματα ἢ τράπεζα (collective use); 22, 54 τὰς εἰσφορὰς πότερον τὰ κτήματα ἢ τὰ σώματα ὀφείλει; 22, 75 ἐκπώματα πλούτου τινὰ δόξαν προσετρίψατο τοῖς κεκτημένοις. There is obvious personification in Lys. 21, 8: οὕτω παρσκευασμένην τριήρη πόσα οἶσθε ἀνηλωκέναι χρήματα ἢ πόσα τοὺς πολεμίους εἰργάσθαι κακά, where Herwerden's correction, παρσκευασμένον <τὴν> τρ. <μ'> οἶσθε, seems quite unnecessary; cf. Dem. 51, 17 τῆς τριήρους τῆς ληφομένης τὸν στέφανον; 24, 12; Th. 8, 106, 4 ἀπέστειλαν τριήρη ἄγγελον τῆς νίκης; 3, 36, 3 (τρ. ἄγγελος, also 36, 2 νῆες βοηθοί). We meet with personification in a simile drawn from weighing, Dem. 5, 12 (ἀργύριον), and in one drawn from the language of medicine, 3, 33 (τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν σιτία). In some cases the popular belief and judicial procedure personified inanimate objects. Thus inanimate objects which had caused death were brought to a formal trial in the court called τὸ ἐπὶ Πρυτανείῳ, and, if found guilty of pollution, were removed beyond the boundaries: Aisch. 3, 244 τὰ ξύλα καὶ τοὺς λίθους καὶ τὸν σίδηρον, τὰ ἄφωνα καὶ ἀγνώμονα, ἐάν τω ἐμπεσόντα ἀποκτείνῃ, ὑπερορίζομεν (see Weidner's note, Jebb on Soph. El. 484 f., and Schömann, Antiq. 295); Dem. 23, 76; cf. Ant. 3, β, 4.

¹ For a still bolder personification in this sphere, compare N. T. Luk. 19, 16: Κύριε, ἡ μὲν σου δέκα προσηργάσατο μνᾶς, 'Lord, thy pound hath gained ten pounds.'

14 PERSONIFICATION AND USE OF ABSTRACT SUBJECTS

(c) Belonging to the commercial or legal language, but most conveniently treated here, are the phrases by which properties or estates are spoken of as bringing in certain rents or subject to certain public liturgies. A species of popular personification has been at work here. E. g. Dem. 27, 64 ὁ δ' ἐμὸς (οἶκος) τριηραρχεῖν εἰθισμένος καὶ μεγάλας εἰσφορὰς εἰσφέρειν; Isai. 7, 32. 42; 8, 35 οἰκίαν μισθοφοροῦσαν; Dem. 27, 60; 36, 11. Here belongs also the use of κινδυνεύειν of money and property (p. 10); for the technical use of εἰσιέναι of the introduction of lawsuits, see Part II, Verbs of Motion.

(d) The trite use of verbs of saying, showing and the like with documentary words, such as ἐπιστολή, γραφή, γράμματα ('letter', 'inscription'), στήλη, μαντεία, μαντεῖον, χρησμός, remains to be noticed. The principle involved as noticed by Rehdantz (Dem. Ind.¹ λέγειν), is that the Greek often treats as a person whatever contains or represents the thought of a person, just as on a larger scale the language is disposed to attribute distinct personality to thought and expression in general (see under λόγος, p. 18 f.). In such phrases the Greek does not distinguish between the letter and its writer, or the oracle and its giver (μαντεῖον used in both senses). Often letter and person are freely coordinated in the same sentence: Aisch. 2, 92 ὥς φησι Χάρης ὁ στρατηγὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιστολή; Dem. 19, 44; cf. Ant. 1, 2. General examples are as follows: Th. 7, 10 ἐπιστολὴν δηλοῦσαν τοιάδε; ib. 16, 1; 1, 129 in. 137, 4; Dem. 9, 41 fin. τί οὖν λέγει τὰ γράμματα ('the inscription'); "Ἀρθμιος" φησὶν, κτέ.; 19, 271 ἀκούετε τῶν γραμμάτων λεγόντων; Hdt. 7, 228. 220; Xen. Hell. 1, 1, 23; Dem. 19, 299 φησὶ δὲ ἡ μαντεία; Ar. Eq. 128 ὁ χρησμός ἄντικρυς λέγει; ib. 121. 177; cf. Ar. Pl. 55. Bolder uses are to be seen in Aisch. 2, 128 λαβέ μοι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι μεγάλα τὴν πόλιν παραλογίζεται; Dem. 19, 15 ἐπιστολὰς ἐπεμψεν ὁ Φίλιππος καλοῦσας ὑμᾶς, οὐχ ἵνα ἐξέλθοιτε, ἀλλ' ἵνα κτέ.; Dem. 21, 54 (αἱ μαντεῖαι) προστάττουσι; Th. 2, 17 (διακωλύειν). For similar uses of technical legal terms, such as νόμος, ψήφισμα, γραφή, with verbs of saying and showing, see p. 17, and for the frequent use of ἐπιστολή with verbs of coming, see Part II, Verbs of Motion.

The legal and political language which finds its chief expression in the orators, has developed many special technical terms which are treated as independent agents and associated with verbs of action. Of these personifications by far the most characteristic and the most fa-

II. Legal Language.

miliar is that of *νόμος*, which has come to be one of the most frequent subjects occurring in the orators. No other abstract conception is so thoroughly and so absolutely personal to the Greek mind except the conception of *πόλις* (also drawn from political life), and possibly that of *λόγος*. We are almost justified in saying that *νόμος* has a double nature and represents both itself and *νομοθέτης*, for which it is often an abbreviated form and for which it can often be actually substituted; we frequently find the two freely alternating in the same passage, as Aisch. 1, 13-20, or the one is to be supplied from the other, as Dem. 24, 34-36. The stage of conscious personification has long since been past with this word, and very bold figures must be used if the force of the personification is to be clearly felt. The number of verbs with which *νόμος* is freely associated is almost unrestricted; most frequent are verbs of commanding or forbidding, permitting or preventing, of saying, showing, determining, acquitting, convicting, punishing, succoring (*βοηθεῖν*), saving, harming, giving, promising, demanding (*ἄξειον*), making and prevailing.

(a) The usage of the orators may be illustrated from Lysias and Demosthenes: Lys. 1, 34 ἐμοῦ οἱ νόμοι οὐ μόνον ἀπεγνωκότες εἰσὶ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κεκελευκότες ταύτην τὴν δίκην λαμβάνειν; 1, 32 ὁ νόμος (οἱ νόμοι) κελεύει, and often; 10, 6. 22, 6 ἀπαγορεύει; 15, 11 κωλύει; 28, 13 ἰσχύει. Similarly with ὑπό after a passive verb: 1, 49 ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τοὺς πολίτας ἐνεδρεύεσθαι; [2], 19. 61.—Dem. 20, 155 τὸν νόμον δε διαρρήδην λέγει, ib. 160; 22, 6. 57; 23, 62 ἤκούσατε τοῦ νόμου λέγοντος ἄντικρυς, 37, 19; 21, 48 ἀκούετε τοῦ νόμου τῆς φιλανθρωπίας, δε οὐδὲ τοὺς δούλους ὑβρίζεσθαι ἀξιοί; 21, 43 οὐκ ἴσῃν τὴν ὀργὴν ἔταξεν ὁ νόμος. ἔπειθ' οἱ φονικοὶ τοὺς μὲν θανάτῳ ζημιοῦσι, τοὺς δὲ φιλανθρωπίας ἡξίωσαν; 21, 1 ἀς ἵνα κωλύθῃ, οἱ νόμοι συνήγαγον ὑμᾶς. So also ὁ νόμος (οἱ νόμοι) κελεύει 20, 89, and in a similar sense λέγει, 8, 28. 21, 9; προστάττει 21, 165. 23, 63; οὐκ ἐγὼ 20, 147. 22, 8; ἀπαγορεύει 23, 28. 35; δίδωσι 20, 154. 23, 56; ὑπισχνεῖται 21, 30. 210; παρέχει 24, 193; τιμωρεῖται 24, 215; ἀπολύει 38, 5; διορίζει 23, 34. 36. 26; διαιρεῖ 20, 28; φράζει 24, 68. 76; φησὶν 20, 156; σφίζει 24, 156. 216; λύει 24, 34. 58; ἰσχύει 24, 135; καθίστησι 3, 11. 22, 34; βλάπτει 3, 10. 20, 49.—Compare also Ant. 3, β, 9 ἀπολύει δὲ καὶ ὁ νόμος ἡμᾶς, ᾧ πιστευόντες ὡς φονεῖα με δίδωκε; Aisch. 3, 169 ἵνα μὴ δυσμενὴς ᾦ τοῖς νόμοις οἱ σφίζουσι τὴν δημοκρατίαν; cf. 3, 22; Th. 2, 53, 4 θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἢ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐδεὶς ἀπείργει; 3, 45. 3.

Cases of still bolder and freer personification are not rare. In Pindar (frg. 151 Böckh) *νόμος* ('custom') is the king who rules

over all (cf. also Plat. Symp. 196, c), and in an uncertain tragedian is called the greatest god known to mankind (inc. trag. frg. 394 N.). In Herodotos (7,104) Demaratos declares that Law is a master more dreaded and more strictly obeyed by the Spartans than the Persian king by his subjects. This personification is not confined to poetry and imaginative prose, but apparently belongs also to the popular language; it is put by Lysias and Aristophanes into the mouth of citizens of the humbler sort. Thus in Lysias Euphiletos in slaying the adulterer declares that he perishes not at his hands, but at the hands of the Law. In Lysias and Demosthenes purpose (γνώμη¹: Lys. 1, 35), foresight (προορᾶσθαι) and precaution (εὐλαβεῖσθαι) are attributed to the laws. According to Aischines (3, 16) and Hypereides (6, 25) the voice (φωνή, φθέγγεσθαι) of the law ought to be obeyed rather than the voice of the advocate or the tyrant. Demosthenes in one passage (21, 224) even thinks it worth while to remind the judges that the laws are after all only written statutes, and possess only moral force; they cannot actually bar the way of the wrongdoer or hasten to the relief of the injured. The conversation of the Laws with Socrates in Pl. Krito 50, a ff. is a well-known passage. Finally the laws are frequently found with the personal designations φύλαξ, συνήγορος, βοηθός, and they are freely co-ordinated with personal subjects, e.g., 'the gods and the laws,' 'I and the law.' E.g. Lys. 1, 26 οὐκ ἐγὼ σε ἀποκτενῶ, ἀλλ' ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος; Ar. Ekkl. 1055 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐγώ, ἀλλ' ὁ νόμος ἔλκει σε; Aisch. 3, 16 ὅταν ἐτέραν μὲν φωνὴν ἀφιῇ ὁ νόμος, ἐτέραν δὲ ὁ ῥήτωρ (a bold metaphor praised by Plin. Ep. 9, 26, 11); Dem. 54, 17 οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὰς ἀναγκαίας προφάσεις, ὅπως μὴ μείζους γίνωνται, προεἰδόντο; 24, 57 ὁ νόμος οὐτοσὶ εὐλαβούμενος τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπέειπε (in this last passage Blass proposes to remove the bold personification by deleting ὁ ν., but the correction appears unnecessary; the language of 24, 36 is still bolder, but here the editors are perhaps justified in supplying νομοθέτης as the subject from a preceding νόμος); 24, 38 ἐφ' ἐκάστην ἀπαντᾷ τὴν ὁδὸν τῶν ἀδικημάτων (ὁ νόμος), κωλύων καὶ οὐκ ἔων βαδίζειν τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας ὑμῖν; cf. Aisch. 3, 37 ἐγὼ δὲ παρέξομαι συνηγόρους τοὺς νόμους τοὺς ὑμετέρους ('I will let your laws plead my case'); 1, 14 (φύλαξ); Dem. 24, 107 τοὺς τῷ γήρα βοηθοὺς λυμαίνει, οἱ καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς γονέας τρέφειν; Aisch. 3, 196 πολιτεία,

¹ Similarly in Latin, Plin. Ep. 1, 14, 9 leges civitatis, quae vel in primis census hominum spectandos arbitrantur.

ἦν οἱ θεοὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι σφίζουσι; ib. 4 (οὐθ' οἱ νόμοι οὐθ' οἱ πρυτάνεις); 2, 184. See also Hense, p. 111.

(b) A somewhat different but equally free use of νόμος as subject is to be seen in the speeches of Demosthenes against the proposed laws of Leptines, Aristokrates, and Timokrates (Orr. XX, XXIII and XXIV). The law attacked is treated as a moral person, and in respect to the effects it will produce is held to as strict accountability as the publicist who has proposed it. E. g. Dem. 24, 209 νόμον τίθεικεν, δε οὐκ ἀνοίγνυσι τὸ δεσποτήριον, ἀλλὰ καθαιρεῖ, προσπεριεῖληφε δὲ καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια; 20, 50 τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν πονηρᾶς δόξης ἀναπλήσει; 20, 155 ὁ νόμος οὗτος τοῦτ' ἀδικεῖ, οἷοι κτέ. ('the law is the criminal in making virtue of no avail'); 20, 4. 10. 17. 34. 55, etc.; 24, 1. 43. 91. 94. 138, etc. A similar use of ψήφισμα is found in 23, 103. 140 and in Lyk. 7; compare also γράμμα used of the clause of a treaty in Th. 5, 29, 3: τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα μάλιστα τὴν Πελοπόννησον διεθορύβει καὶ ἐς ὑποψίαν καθίστη.

(c) Following the analogy of νόμος, many other technical legal terms are freely placed as subjects, chiefly with verbs of saying, commanding, showing and witnessing; thus most often ψήφισμα:—Lys. 13, 50 πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ψηφίσματα αὐτοῦ καταμαρτυρεῖ, διαρρήδην ἀγορεύοντα . . . ἔπειτα ἡ κρίσις διαρρήδην λέγει; ib. 28; ib. 71 τὸ ψ. δηλώσει; ib. 72 τὸ ψ. ἐλέγξει; Dem. 20, 42. 116; 51, 18; Dein. 1, 80 φησὶ τὸ ψήφισμα; Aisch. 2, 98 τὸ ψ. προσέταττεν; ib. 91; Dem. 24, 29 τὸ ψ. ἐκέλευεν; 51, 1; 24, 101; 8, 6; 20, 132; Dein. 2, 23; Aisch. 2, 66 ποιεῖ μου τὴν δημηγορίαν ὁ μὲν κατήγορος διαιρετήν, τὸ ψήφισμα δὲ καὶ τὰληθὲς μίαν; Hyp. 1, col. 1. Compare also the personification of ψήφισμα in the celebrated passage Dem. 18, 188: τοῦτο τὸ ψ. τὸν κίνδυνον παρελθεῖν ἐποίησεν ὥσπερ νέφος ('the decree issued forth and the danger passed away like a cloud'), and the metaphorical use of πιτάκιον in Dem. 8, 28: μικρὸν π. ταῦτα κωλύσαι δύναται ἂν ('a very small tablet of impeachment would effectually put a stop to all this'). Like other publicist's terms, ψήφισμα is freely used with νεκᾶν—'the decree was carried', Dem. 24, 27; 19, 43—and the terms φεύγειν and ἀποφεύγειν are frequently applied to it in accordance with the processes of Attic law, as Dem. 23, 58. 98; 18, 222.

Other technical terms similarly used are δόγμα, προβούλευμα, γραφή, μαρτυρία, στήλη, γράμμα, συνθήκαι, ψήφος: Aisch. 2, 60. 61; 3, 126; Ant. 1, 2 ὥς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἡ γραφή λέγει; Dem. 29, 9 τῶν μαρτυριῶν ὅσαι αὐτοῦ κατεμαρτύρουν; ib. 7; And. 1, 116 ἡ στήλη κελεύει; Dem. 20, 128 ἀκούετε τῶν ἀντιγράφων τῆς στήλης κελευόντων; ib. 130;

18 PERSONIFICATION AND USE OF ABSTRACT SUBJECTS

Th. 6, 55, 1; Dem. 45, 34; Isokr. 8, 20 *αἱ συνθήκαι προστάττουσι*; ib. 16; 14, 10; And. 3, 14; cf. Isokr. 4, 176; Hyp. 5, 22 f. (*κρατεῖν*); Lys. 13, 37 *τὴν καθαιρουσαν ψῆφον*; Dem. 19, 66 *τὴν σφύζουσαν ψῆφον*; cf. also 23, 167.

Under a third head may be classed (a) expressions referring to speech and its literary forms, all embraced in Greek under the comprehensive term *λόγος* and closely related words, (b) subjects relating to education and philosophy, (c) terms connected with civil and political life. Much the larger number of such subjects is naturally furnished by Isokrates, who is essentially an essayist on rhetoric, education and large political questions.

The same tendency of the Greek spirit, which, as we have seen (pp. 14, 17), causes it to attribute speech and other personal ac-

(a) Rhetorical
Terms. *Λόγος*.

tions to the letter or the decree as representative of their writers, leads in a broader field to the free personification in language of all the products of thought, notably of *λόγος* and kindred notions. We sometimes speak even in modern English of an author's speech or essay as advising and warning us or as approving or disapproving certain actions, but outside of technical language we rarely attribute such personal actions to the speech unless the reference to the person or the author is kept clearly in mind. It is only in book reviews or in philosophical and technical writings that we are likely often to meet with such phrases as 'This treatise seeks (Gk. *βούλεται*) to prove,' or 'This book condemns (Gk. *ἐπιπλήττει*) such views.' This usage remains restricted and occasional in English, and has no such place in the popular consciousness as the Greek usage appears to have. We may say that the Greek often goes as far in common language as the English goes in technical language, and in philosophical writing the Greek goes, on the whole, much further. Many of the Greek phrases may be paralleled in the formal style of older English, which is itself based largely upon classical models, but few writers of the present day would write as boldly as Isokrates, for example, in addressing Philip: Isokr. 5, 137 *ἦν ὑπολάβῃς μὴ μόνον τὸν λόγον τοῦτόν σε παρακαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς προγόνους καὶ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων ἀνανδρίαν*. We may distinguish at least two classes in the use of these rhetorical terms.

(a) The speech or writing (*λόγος*) represents the writer who composes it (*λογογράφος*), and refers to the writer's purpose and opinion. The verbs which occur most commonly are those of

advising, teaching, persuading, praising, blaming, making, wishing and daring. E. g. Isokr. 15, 57 ἔστι δ' (ὁ λόγος ὁ πανηγυρικός) τοὺς μὲν Ἑλλήνας παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατείαν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἀμφισβητῶν; 5, 18 Φιλίππῳ συμβουλευέσοντα λόγον πέμπειν; 9, 11 ἀποπειρατίον τῶν λόγων ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο δυνήσονται, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εὐλογεῖν; cf. 13, 21 (παρακελεύεσθαι); 4, 17 (πείθειν); 9, 4 (ποιεῖν); 4, 129 (παύειν); 20, 183 (χρησθαι). The character or class of the composition is often given by the participle of the verb. Isokrates commonly avoids the adjectives in -ικός (συμβουλευτικός, ἐπιδεικτικός, etc.) which later technical writers prefer to employ for this purpose. E. g. 2, 42 τὰ συμβουλευόντα τῶν συγγραμμάτων; 15, 62 χρησιμωτέρους εἶναι τῶν λόγων τοὺς ἐπιπλήττοντας ἢ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας; ib. 67. 76. 77; 3, 10 τοὺς παραινοῦντας. Especial attention may be called to the use of verbs of wishing, daring and professing with λόγος and kindred subjects. Here it is possible to render βούλεσθαι in English by 'seek, attempt,' but we are more likely to soften the expression by the passive turn 'be intended, be meant.' E. g. Isokr. 15, 13 τὴν ἀπολογίαν τὴν προσποιουμένην μὲν περὶ κρίσεως γεγράφθαι, βουλομένην δὲ περὶ ἐμοῦ δηλῶσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ib. 195 ταῦτα βούλεται δηλοῦν, cf. Plat. Phil. 35, d φαίνεται βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος; Isokr. 15, 100 (ἐθέλειν); 8, 39 λόγος ὁ τολμῶν τοῖς ἀμαρτανομένοις ἐπιπλήττειν; 10, 4 τῆς τερβρείας τῆς ἐξελέγχειν προσποιουμένης. Similar uses of βούλεσθαι are common enough in the philosophical language of Plato and Aristotle, as Plat. Krat. 412, c καὶ μὴν τό γε ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο τῷ ἀγαστῷ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα ἐπικεῖσθαι; ib. 414, a. Of concrete things, compare Aristoph. Ekk1. 753 τί τὰ σκευῆρια βούλεται; 368.

This use of λόγος is, as is well known, one of those standing personifications of the Greek language which have played a large part in the development of Greek philosophy, and, through the medium of philosophy, exercised an important influence upon subsequent speculative thought. For the Stoic personification of λόγος as the universal Reason, see Zeller, Stoics and Epicureans, Engl. ed., p. 142 ff., Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. Graec., 7 ed., p. 409 ff.; for the identification of the λόγος in Philo Judaeus with the Semitic personification of Wisdom, see Ritter and Preller, l. l., p. 497 ff. A species of substantial or personal reality was very early attributed to this abstraction, as may be clearly seen from Gorg. Ἐλ. ἐγκ. 8. 12. 14 f.: 'The Argument is a mighty sovereign, which is possessed of a small material form (σῶμα), yet accomplishes divine deeds. . . . Helen is unjustly blamed for going to Troy; the true culprit is the Argument which persuaded

her.' The personification of the *Δίκαιος* and the **Ἄδικος Λόγος* in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes needs only to be mentioned. Isokrates (3, 6 ff.) pronounces an extended eulogy upon *λόγος* as the founder of human society, the chief inventor, law-giver, and educator, the natural leader in all thinking and doing. The personification is a favorite one with Plato. Thus the Argument speaks¹ as an interlocutor in the dialogue (*Phaid.* 87, a), seeks to prove its contention (*Phil.* 35, d), persuades and captivates its hearers (*Phaid.* 88, d), who follow in the footsteps of the Argument (*Rep.* 365, c), it upbraids and laughs to scorn (*Protag.* 361, a; cf. *Charm.* 175, d), does not remain in one place but moves about (*Euthyphr.* 15, b), gets away from one (*Phaid.* 89, c), 'travels a long way' (*Rep.* 484, a²), turns aside and veils the face for fear (*Rep.* 503, a³), dies and cannot be brought to life again (*Phaid.* 89, b), saves and is saved (*Rep.* 621, b). See Stallbaum on *Phaid.* 89, b, and Jowett and Campbell, *Republic*, vol. II, p. 247, and vol. III, Index, *Personification*.

(b) The cases are simpler in which the speech really stands for itself, and the predicate states the effects which are produced by the speech after its composition. E. g. Isokr. 4, 6 *ταῦτον τὸν λόγον* (i. e., the *Panegyrikos*), *ὃς τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάξει*; 5, 84 *ὁ λόγος ὁ πανηγυρικός, ὁ τοὺς ἄλλους εὐπορωτέρους ποιήσας, ἐμοὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρέσχηκεν*; 5, 10; 15, 154. Often with *ποιεῖν*, as 15, 52; 8, 62; cf. 15, 236. 230 : with *ὠφελεῖν*, as 8, 40; 15, 258; 4, 4; 3, 10; cf. 15, 178. 280; 10, 1 : with *βλάπτειν*, as 15, 56. 98 : with *λυπεῖν*, as 15, 35. 141. 228.

(c) In the remaining orators and Thukydides both uses may be treated together; personification is frequent. *Dem.* 8, 77 *εἰ μέντοι καθεδεῖσθε, οὐχ ὁρῶ λόγον ὅστις δυνήσεται τὴν πόλιν σῶσαι*; 21, 24 *ὁ κωλύσας ἐξαπατηθῆναι λόγος ὑμᾶς*; *And.* 1, 29 *οἱ λόγοι τῶν κατηγορῶν ταῦτα τὰ δεινὰ καὶ φρικώδη ἀνωρθίαζον*, where, however, Blass with great plausibility reads *οἱ λόγοι τῶν κατηγορῶν, (οἱ) κτέ.*; in any case the phrase is a highly poetical one, cf. Blass, *AB.* I 302; [*Lys.*] 2, 54 *τίς γὰρ ἂν ἢ λόγος ἢ χρόνος ἢ ῥήτωρ ἱκανὸς γένοιτο μνηῦσαι τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετὴν*; *Hyp.* 6, 34 (*ἐγκωμιάζειν*); *Lys.* 4, 12 (*ισχύειν*); *Aisch.* 1, 116 (*ὑπομνησκειν*); 3, 170 (*πείθειν*); *Th.* 1, 82, 3 (*ὑποσημαίνειν*); 3, 44, 4 (*ἐπισπᾶσθαι*); 53, 3. 83, 2; 6, 76, 1.

¹ Cf. *Cic. Orat.* 27, 92 *oratio sedate placideque loquitur*, and see Krebs-Schmalz, *Antibarb.*, p. 22.

² Adopting with most MSS. the reading *διεξεληθόντος*; see Campbell's note *ad loc.*

³ *παρεξιώντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν.*

Isokrates frequently employs as subjects words relating to philosophy, education and training (*παιδεία, παιδευσις, φιλοσοφία,*

(b) *Philosophical Terms.* *διατριβή, ἐπιμέλεια, ἐμπειρία, ἐπιστήμη, μαθήματα*). A collection of such subjects will serve to illustrate

the free and varied usage of a professional writer in this department. E. g. Isokr. 13, 15 *ἡ παιδευσις τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀγωνιστὰς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς οὐκ ἂν ἀποτελέσειεν, αὐτοὺς δ' ἂν αὐτῶν προαγάγοι*; 15, 175 *ἡ φιλοσοφία τοιαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν ὥστε διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους*; Ep. 6, 6 *αἱ γὰρ ἐμπειρίαι παιδεύουσι τοὺς τηλικούτους καὶ ποιοῦσι καθορᾶν τὸ βέλτιστον*; 15, 203. 204. 211. 295; 13, 11. Especially frequent is the association of *ὠφελεῖν* with such subjects in Isokrates: 15, 199. 213. 175. 266. 269. 264; 13, 20; Ep. 8, 5 *αἱ ἐπιστήμαι . . . ὠφελοῦσαι τοὺς χρωμένους*. Isokrates at times employs bolder metaphors: 'Philosophy and education are benefactors and legislators for mankind; the one points out the true course theoretically, the other follows closely the actual needs of life.' E. g. 2, 12 *τῆς παιδείσεως δυνάμει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν εὐεργετεῖν*; 15, 264; 11, 22 (*φιλοσοφία*) *καὶ νομοθετῆσαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν ζητῆσαι δύναται*; 2, 35 *τὸ μὲν φιλοσοφεῖν τὰς ὁδοὺς σοὶ δείξει, τὸ δὲ γυμνάζεσθαι δύνασθαι σε χρῆσθαι ποιήσει*; 15, 262 (*τὰ μαθήματα*) *τῷ βίῳ παρακολουθεῖν*. See especially the personification of *φιλοσοφία* in 4, 47: Philosophy has discovered the institutions of civilized life and softened the passions; she has educated men for action, and knowing the importance of speech she has paid especial honor to eloquence. Cf. also Ep.

1, 9: *τῆς παιδείσεως τῆς τῶν μὲν μικρῶν καταφρονούσης, τῶν δὲ μεγάλων ἐφικνεῖσθαι πειρωμένης*, and for striking personifications of *ἐπιστήμη* and *ἐμπειρία*, see Th. 2, 87, 4; ib. 89, 2. Abstract subjects relating to rhetoric and philosophy are very frequent also in Plato and often show bold personification. E. g. Gorg. 482, a *τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικὰ, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν*; 459, b *αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ (τὴν ῥητορικὴν) εἰδέναι*; 464, c *ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείματα, προσποιεῖται κτέ.*; 464, d (*ἡ ὀψοποικὴ*); 465, b (*ἡ κομωτικὴ*).

The political terms relating to the government and constitution of the state—*δημοκρατία, ισότης, ὀλιγαρχία, μοναρχία, τυραννίς, πολιτεία*—

(c) *Political Terms.* are freely used as subjects in technical and philosophical language. The use of these abstracts in a collective sense is often only an

extension of the use of *δῆμος, μόναρχος, τύραννος, πόλις*, etc., and it is not surprising to find that *δημοκρατία* was publicly worshipped at Athens as a goddess, see Usener, *Götternamen*, p. 370. As a whole the use of the abstract terms belongs to the more elevated style;

hence Isokrates affords numerous examples, especially in the Areopagitikos (Or. VII), while the other orators content themselves with the simple *δῆμος* or *πόλις*. E. g. Isokr. 3, 15 αἱ μὲν δημοκρατίαι τὰς ἰσότητας ζητοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ μοναρχίαι πλείστον νέμονται τῷ βελτίστῳ; 7, 66. 26; ib. 61 οἷς αἱ μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαι πολεμοῦσιν; ib. 22 τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν (ἰσότητα) ἕκαστον τιμῶσαν καὶ κολάζουσιν; 3, 16 διορᾶν τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰς τυραννίδας μᾶλλον; ib. 22; Ep. 4, 7. An extended personification of *πολιτεία* is seen in 7, 14 and 20: The soul of a state is its constitution; it deliberates on every question and seeks to avoid disaster; by hating and punishing law-breakers the constitution trains good citizens. 4, 16; 7, 12. 55; ib. 71 τῆς πολιτείας τῆς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διαπεπραγμένης. In Thukydides also we find a similar use: 3, 37, 1 ἥδη ἔγνω δημοκρατίαν ὅτι ἀδυνατόν ἐστιν ἐτέρων ἄρχειν; 8, 47, 2; 6, 39, 2 (ὀλιγαρχία); 2, 37, 1 χρώμεθα πολιτεία οὐ ζηλοῦσθαι τοὺς τῶν πέλας νόμους. Cf. Dem. 20, 108 τὰς διὰ τῶν ὀλίγων πολιτείας . . . ὁμονοεῖν; 15, 19. Somewhat different is Demosthenes' use of *πολιτεία* in reference to his administration or public policy; here the word serves as a periphrasis for the person. E. g. 18, 93 οὐ μόνον τὸ Βυζάντιον σῶσαι ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ πολιτεία διεπράξατο, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσιν ἔδειξεν κτέ.; ib. 222. 230. 317.

CLASS III.

RHETORICAL PERSONIFICATION.

The subject of personification, in so far as it relates to the usage of the Greek poets, has received extended treatment from Hense in his valuable works, *Poetische Personification in griechischen Dichtungen u. s. w.*, Halle, 1868, and *Beseelende Personification in griech. Dichtungen*, Parchim, 1874, Schwerin, 1877; in the introduction to the first-named work Hense has also discussed at length the relation of personification both to the mythological tendency of the Greeks and to the free poetic fancy. For the Orators, Roschatt, *Metaphern bei d. att. Rednern*, Straubing, 1886, p. 39 ff., has contributed a brief but excellent section upon this subject; for Plato, see Jowett and Campbell, *Republic*, II 247 f. Some examples of the use of Personification in Demosthenes are also brought together by Straub, *De tropis et figuris Demosthenis et Ciceronis*, Wirceburg, 1883, p. 37 ff. The favorite personification of abstract con-

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the Subject.

ceptions among the Romans¹ has been treated by Engelhard, *De personificationibus in poesi atque arte Romanorum*, Göttingen, 1881; other literature is enumerated by Nägelsbach, *Lat. Stilistik*, p. 572. As previously stated, the present treatment of Personification is limited almost entirely to the cases in which abstract subjects are personified by association with *verbs* properly used of persons; examples of personifying adjectives and substantives will rarely be noted.

Personification, which is wholly a modern term, should be generally distinguished from the ancient figure of *προσωποποιία*,

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although the two words are often used interchangeably by modern writers. Through Personification the most various actions and qualities of animate beings are attributed to inanimate things; *προσωποποιία* is the figure by which an imaginary speech is put for rhetorical effect in the mouth of an absent person or of an inanimate thing treated as a person; see Volkmann, *Rhet.*, pp. 280, 489; Straub, *l. l.*, p. 89; Gerber, *Sprache als Kunst*, II 293; cf. Blass III¹ 177. Thus the two terms are not properly coextensive, but overlap only in such cases as Dem. I, 2: *ὁ μὲν οὖν παρὼν καιρὸς, ὃ δὲ Ἄ., μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφ' αἰεὶς, ὅτι κτέ.* More rarely the term *προσωποποιία* is used by the ancient rhetoricians of the simple personification of abstract terms, see Rutil. Lup. ap. Halm *Rhet. Min.*, p. 15; Phoib. ap. Sp. *Rhet. Gr.* III 52; Anon. ib. 212; Georg. Choirob. ib. 254; Ernesti, *Lex. Technol. Gr. s. v. προσωποποιία*, and compare the use of *πρόσωπον* in Dionys. Ep. 2 ad Ammae. 14; Schol. on Dem. I, 15. Some of the passages in the ancient rhetoricians which bear upon the use of Personification have already been brought together by Volkmann, *Rhet.* p. 419, Straub, p. 37, and Gerber II 79, but it seems desirable to collect these references somewhat more fully than these writers have done. The ancient rhetoricians have commonly included Personification under their treatment of metaphor. Thus among the examples of notable metaphors given by Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3, 10, there are not a few which consist in the use of this figure. E. g. *ὥστε βοῆσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα*; *ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τελευτησάντων κείρασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὡς συγκαταθαπτο-*

¹ Owing, doubtless, to their fondness for abstract conceptions and abstract figures, the Roman poets easily surpassed their Greek models in this field, cf. Weise, *Charakteristik der lat. Sprache*, p. 89 (2 Aufl.).

μένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας' (cf. [Lys.] 2, 60); 'παρακαλεῖν τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσαντας'; 'οὐδὲ τὴν ἱκετηρίαν αἰσχυνθέντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῇν.' (Upon this last Aristotle remarks, 'The bronze statue of the accused is represented as a suppliant, the inanimate object is represented as animate'). Such metaphors, Aristotle adds, serve to bring their objects clearly before the mind's eye (πρὸ ὀμμάτων), and in general the representation of lifeless objects as living, moving and in a state of activity is a chief means of producing vividness or ἐνέργεια. Similarly, when Isokrates speaks of a man 'with his vigor all in bloom',—ἀνθοῦσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμήν, Isokr. 5, 10—he has used something more than a simple metaphor, for the figure is full of the warmth and vigorous energy of life, like the growing and flourishing plant from which it is drawn. Homer is especially praised for his frequent use of metaphors which attribute life and motion to inanimate objects: κέχρηται Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ τῷ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα ποιεῖν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς.—κινούμενα καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια κινήσεις (Rhet. 3, 11; cf. Dio Chrys. 12, 410; Plin. Ep. 9, 26, 6). Examples cited are Δ 574 (δοῦρα) ἐν γαίῃ ἴσταντο λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἄσαι; O 542 αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο μαιμώωσα; λ 598 λᾶας ἀναιδῆς; N 587. 799; Δ 126.¹

Many of Aristotle's statements and examples are repeated by the later rhetoricians. So the metaphor ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν καλουμένη is mentioned by Demetrios, Sp. Rhet. Gr. III 281, and metaphors ἀπὸ ἐμψύχων ἐπὶ ἄψυχα constitute one of the four classes of metaphors which are generally recognized by the rhetoricians; see Tryph. Sp. III 192, Anon. 208, Gregor. 216, Kokondr. 232, Georg. Choirob. 246; cf. Quintil. 8, 6, 10. Tryphon, Sp. III 192,

¹ Compare the language of Pope, Pref. to Trans. of the Iliad: 'Aristotle had reason to say, He was the only poet who had found out *living words*; there are in him more daring figures and metaphors than in any good author whatever. An arrow is *impatient* to be on the wing, and a weapon *thirsts* to drink the blood of an enemy, and the like'. Similarly Gladstone, Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age, III p. 422 f.: 'His uplifting and vitalizing process is everywhere at work. Animate nature is raised even into divinity, and inanimate nature is born upward into life. His waves, when they are stirred, shout, in the very word, *ἰάχειν*, that he gives to the assembly of the Achaeans; when they break in foam, they put on the plumes of the warrior's helmet, *κορύσσεσθαι*; when their lord drives over them, they open wide for joy; and, when he strides upon the field of battle, they, too, boil upon the shore, in an irrepressible sympathy with his effort and emotion'.

distinguishes the application to inanimate objects of terms properly used of persons (*ἡ λέξις ἰδίως ἐπὶ ἐμψύχου τασσομένη*) as a metaphor designed for vivid expression, *ἐμφάσεως ἔνεκα*, in opposition to the metaphor intended to express likeness, *δμοιώσεως ἔνεκα*; similarly Gregor. III 216, cf. Kokondr. 232, Georg. Choirob. 246. Examples of such vivifying metaphors cited by the rhetoricians are: Hom. T 362 γέλασε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθών; N 339 ἔφριξεν δὲ μάχη; Anon. ap. Georg. Choirob. III 246 ἡ θάλασσα εἶδε καὶ ἔφυγε. Other favorite examples of the metaphor *ἀπὸ ἐμψύχου ἐπὶ ἄψυχον* are: Hom. B 456 οὐρεὸς ἐν κορυφῇ; Y 59 πόδες πολυπιδάκου Ἴδης, but these latter are commonly classed as metaphors which express likeness.

Hermogenes also has repeatedly noticed the pleasing effect which is produced by attributing voluntary actions to lifeless objects. Thus in the chapter *περὶ γλυκύτητος* (π. ιδ. β', § 317, Sp. II 360) he points out that to endow inanimate objects with will and choice and to use of them the terms which properly belong to persons is a means of adding greatly to the beauty of the style, e. g. Plat. Phaidr. 230, d τὰ μὲν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδὲν με θέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἄνθρωποι; Sappho frg. 17 ἄγε χέλυ διὰ μοι λέγε. Herodotos is especially praised for his pleasing use of such personifications, and the rebuke administered by Xerxes to the Hellespont is cited as an example (Hdt. 7. 35). In the episode of Abradatas and Pantheia (Kyrop. 7, 3, 8) Xenophon is praised for the beauty and pathos of the descriptive phrase *ἡ χεὶρ τοῦ νεκροῦ ἐπηκολούθησεν* (ch. 7, § 345, Sp. II 381).

Ps.-Longinos, *περὶ ὕψους*, classes the bolder forms of personification among the grand images (*φαντασίαι*) which the poet and the orator, in moments of extreme exaltation or ecstatic passion, seek to call up and bring vividly before the minds of their auditors. He blames the orators of his own day for pushing this tendency to the verge of bombast and introducing 'visions of the tragic furies' too freely in their speeches. Ps.-Longinos cites (XV, 6) examples from the poets of the personification of places and inanimate objects in nature, e. g. Aisch. Edon. frg. 58 N. ἐνθουσιᾷ δὲ δῶμα, βακχεύει στέγη; Eur. Bacch. 726 πᾶν δὲ συνεβάκχευ' ὄρος. As a case in which the oratorical imagination has passed the bounds of simple persuasion and sought the most daring effects, he cites (XV, 10) Hyperides' reply when he was impeached for proposing the liberation of the slaves after the battle of Chaironeia: Hyp. frg. 32 τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα οὐχ ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔγραψεν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχη, 'This decree was framed, not by the orator, but by the

battlefield of Chaironeia'. With this passage of Hypereides Jahn compares Demad. frg. 8: τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα οὐκ ἐγὼ ἔγραψα, ἀλλ' ὁ πόλεμος τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δόρατι γράφων. The elevation of style which results from bold personifications is further noted by Quintilian, 8, 6, 11; 12, 10, 61 f., e. g. Verg. Aen. 8, 728 pontem indignatus Araxes; Cic. pro Lig. 3, 9; by Porphyry on Hor. Epod. 2, 17, and by Servius on Verg. Georg. 1, 103. The latter remarks: phantasia est poetica, rei inanimatae sensum dare, and cites also Georg. 2, 82 miraturque (arbos) novas frondes et non sua poma.

These statements are sufficient to show the significance and importance of Personification as an element of oratorical style. It will be observed that the great majority, though by no means all, of the examples of this species of metaphor cited by the rhetoricians refer to the personification of concrete objects, of lands and of countries. This type of personification is prevailingly poetical, and will be treated first (I). Numerous examples of its occurrence in the poets are given by Hense, Poet. Personif., xvi ff. Of much more importance for the style of the orators is the personification of abstract notions, which will be treated under a separate head (II).

The personification of concrete objects is only a step removed from the invocation of the powers of Nature. Of the latter Hense,

xix, writes as follows: 'The personification of Nature has its origin in the passion of man. The stronger his passion, the more he is disposed to ascribe to Nature moral sympathy and feeling, (so Prometheus in his terrible sufferings, Aesch. Prom. 88 ff.)' Hence this species of personification belongs properly to poetic ecstasy (the φαντασία ἢ παρὰ ποιηταῖς of the author π. ὕψους), and it is scarcely consistent with the masculine vigor of the best Greek oratory. Lysias goes no further than to introduce a naval captain boasting that his ship has used up (ἀνηλωκεῖναι) a great sum of money and done good service for the state (Lys. 21, 8). It is only Lykurgos, with his poetical sympathies and his well-known fondness for bold metaphors, who accuses Leokrates of having profaned the sacred relics of his ancestors by requiring them to leave their native land and to accompany him into exile (συμφεύγειν: § 25), or who appeals to the groves and the temples which have contributed all their stores for the public defence (§ 44). Still bolder in its striving after pathos is the celebrated epilogue of the Leokratea (§ 150): 'Land and trees beseech you; harbors, docks

and city-walls entreat you; temples and sanctuaries implore your aid'. Upon this last personification Rehdantz remarks that it is no less startling than the much criticized apostrophe of Aisch. III 260, and that both passages afford an illustration of how the Greek spirit begins to lose its finer sense of proportion and to degenerate into empty bathos; see also Blass III¹ 123; Jebb AO. II 380. Compare also the following: Dein. 1, 109 δικαιοτέρον (ἀν) ἐλεήσατε τὴν χώραν, ἢ τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῆς γεγεννημένους ὑμᾶς ἱκετεύει τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν προδότην καὶ σφάζειν αὐτήν; Th. 3, 67, 3 οἱ πρεσβῦται λελειμμένοι καὶ οἰκίαι ἐρήμοι ὑμῶν ἱκετεῖαν ποιοῦνται τοῦσδε τιμωρήσασθαι; Aisch. 3, 259 (epilogue) τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι τελευτήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς τάφους τοὺς τῶν προγόνων οὐκ οἶσθε στενάξειν; Dein. 2, 14 φυλάξαι (οὐ) δεδύνηται τὸ δεσμωτήριον; cf. Lyk. 89.

Worthy of note also is the personification of inanimate things which is induced by making them the *object* of verbs expressing feelings which are properly excited only by persons, e. g. ἐλεεῖν, αἰσχύνεσθαι. This usage is found even in single passages of Lysias and Demosthenes: Lys. 13, 15 οὐκ ἐλεοῦντες τὰ τεῖχη, εἰ πεσεῖται. οὐδὲ κηδόμενοι τῶν νεῶν, εἰ Λακεδαιμονίοις παραδοθήσονται; Dem. 19, 267 οὔτε τὸν ἥλιον ἢ σχύνονθ' οἱ ταῦτα ποιοῦντες, οὔτε τὴν γῆν πατρίδ' οὐσαν ἐφ' ἧς ἔστασαν κτέ.; often in Lyk., as 17. 21, etc.; Dein. 3, 13; 1, 109; Lykol. ap. Ar. Rhet. 3, 10.

Far more frequent in prose is the personification of πατρίς (following the analogy of πόλις), and of names of lands and countries. E. g. Dem. 18, 280 τοὺς αὐτοὺς φιλεῖν οὐσπερ ἀν ἡ πατρίς; ib. 170 καλοῦσης τῆς πατρίδος τῇ κοινῇ φωνῇ; Lyk. 21 τῆς ἐκθρεψάσης αὐτὸν πατρίδος; Dein. 3, 20 (διαδικάζεσθαι). It need scarcely be said that πόλις is a thoroughly personal conception to the Greek mind, both when used of Athens and when used of foreign states. Hence it is necessary to note only the highly metaphorical expressions which attribute human emotions and feelings to πόλις, e. g. the city mourns or laughs, awakes, is sick unto death, etc. Dem. 19, 305 προσέχει τοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ ἐγείρεται ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις ('Athens awakes and becomes alert'; Ἀθῆναι in this use is unknown in Greek prose; more commonly ἡ πόλις simply or ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν, as Isokr. 4, 29). Dem. 18, 45 αἱ πόλεις ἐνόσουν; Aisch. 3, 211 ἐφ' οἷς ἡ πόλις ἐπένθησε καὶ ἐκέρατο; [Lys.] 2, 66; cf. Ar. Pax 539 f. οἶον πρὸς ἀλλήλας λαλοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις | διαλλαγεῖσαι καὶ γελῶσιν ἄσμεναι. Again, the city possesses a soul in its constitution (Isokr. 7, 14), and kings in its laws (Plat. Symp. 196, c), is endowed with im-

mortality and must suffer the penalty of its deeds (Isokr. 8, 120). The death of a city is its desolation (Lyk. 61), and traitors have pronounced sentence of death against so great a city as Athens (Hyp. 4, 7; 5, 29; Lyk. 149), but, unlike the dead tyrant, the city revives and renews its strength (Hyp. 4, 7).

Names of countries are not commonly associated with verbs of action in the classical languages (for the Latin usage, see Krebs, *Antibarbar.*, pp. 22, 24), yet the personification of Hellas and other lands follows naturally upon the personification of Nature, and early became familiar in Greek art and poetry, see especially A. Gerber, l. l., p. 249 ff. Hence the combined influence of the plastic art and the poetic fancy have prepared the way for similar personifications in the more elevated passages of the Orators. Thus human actions and passions are attributed to 'Ελλάς, i. e., she mourns, grieves, is sick even to death, crouches down in self-abasement, shouts aloud, submits to the tyrant, is aroused to action, etc. It is noteworthy that the mere collective use does not occur in the Orators. E. g. [Lys.] 2, 60, cited above p. 23 f.; Dem. 9, 39 ὅφ' ὡν ἀπόλωλε καὶ νερόσηκεν ἡ 'Ελλάς; Hyp. 6, 10 ὁρῶν τὴν 'Ελλάδα πᾶσαν τεταπεινωμένην καὶ κατεπτηχυῖαν; Dein. 1, 34 ἡ 'Ελλάς ἅπασα ἀχθομένη τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασιν ἡσμένει μεταβολὴν τινα; Hyp. 6, 20 νόμφ τῷ (τοῦ δεσπότου) τρόμφ χρῆσθαι τὴν 'Ελλάδα; [Lys.] 2, 21 (ἀμύνασθαι); Dem. 19, 306 (περιορᾶν); Lyk. frg. 75 (δουλεύειν); Isokr. 7, 12. Compare especially the complete personification shown in Eur. Hel. 370 ff.: βοᾶν βοᾶν δ' 'Ελλάς | κελάδῃσε κἀνοτόνυξεν, | ἐπὶ δὲ κρατὶ χέρας ἔθηκεν, | ὄνυχι δ' ἀπαλόχροα γένυν | ἔδενσε φοινίαισι πλαγαῖς. A similar use is found in the case of other names of countries and cities:¹ Isokr. 10, 67 τότε πρῶτον τὴν Εὐρώπην τῆς Ἀσίας τρόπαιον στήσασαν; 14, 33 ἡ Βοιωτία προπολεμεῖ τῆς ὑμετέρας χώρας; Aisch. 3, 133 Θῆβαι δέ, Θῆβαι, πόλις ἀστυγείτων, ἐκ μέσης τῆς 'Ελλάδος ἀνῆρπασται, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευσάμενοι; 2, 152; Dem. 18, 18 ἡ Πελοπόννησος ἅπασα δεισθήκει; 18, 304. The purely local or literal use is very rare in the Orators: Dem. 16, 21 κινδυνεύσει Μεσσήνη (v. l. κίνδυνος Μεσσήνη); cf. 19, 252 ἀφεστηκυίας Σαλαμῖνος.

Thukydides, too, has the rhetorical personification of names of countries, especially 'Ελλάς, as Th. 2, 11, 2 ἡ 'Ε. πᾶσα προσέχει τὴν γνώμην, εὐνοίαν ἔχουσα; cf. 1, 12, 4 ἡ 'Ε. ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψε; 1, 123, 1. But he has also the purely collective use and places the names

¹ On the personification of cities and other abstract entities in Greek bas-reliefs, see Collignon, *Greek Archaeol.*, Eng. tr., p. 233 ff.

of countries instead of their inhabitants with greater freedom perhaps than any other Greek writer. This use of the collective noun (σῶμα) is noted as especially characteristic of Thukydides by Dionys., de Thuk. iud., 24, 3, and, according to the statement of the author π. ὕψους, c. 24, serves to produce elevation of style. E. g. 1, 6, 1 *πᾶσα ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐσιδηροφόρει*, 'in ancient times all the Hellenes carried weapons'; 1, 13, 1; 8, 80, 2 *τὸ Βυζάντιον ἐπεκρηκεύετο*; 1, 55, 2 *ἡ Κέρκυρα οὕτω περιγύγεται τῷ πολέμῳ*; 1, 68 f.; 1, 61, 3 (*ἡ Ποτεΐδαια*); 3, 49 f. (*ἡ Μυτιλήνη*); 6, 34, 4 (*Τάρας*). Other examples are simpler and may be paralleled from other authors, as 8, 44, 2 *προσεχώρησε Ῥόδος Πελοποννησίοις*; 3, 2, 1 *Λέσβος ἀπέστη, βουλευθέντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου*; 1, 114, 1; 4, 69, 2. 88, 2; 8, 23 f.; cf. Hdt. 5, 103 f. See also Kühner-Gerth, II¹ § 346, 4, and, on the wide extension of this use in Tacitus and some other Latin authors, see Meyer, l. l., p. 4 ff.

The personification of abstract conceptions has its origin among the Greeks, according to Hense, in the fancy which created the gods and legends of the mythology. From this

II. Personification of General Abstract Notions.

mythological tendency has been developed later the free poetical fancy, which introduces freely the personification of moral ideas and powers. 'How easy the transition was from abstractions represented as gods to free poetical personification, can be seen from Bacchylides' paean upon Eirene, Aristotle's poem upon *Ἀρετή*, and the skolion upon *Ὑγίεια*. The transition may be seen also in many other forms created by the Greek poets. The comedians especially were bold enough to imagine forms which neither possessed nor ever acquired a place in the mythology of popular belief, e. g. *Διαλλαγὴ* (Ar. Ach. 953), *Ἀπαιόλη* (Nub. 1151), *Πόλεμος* (Pax 254).' (Hense, Poet. Personif. xxiv). Finally, it is scarcely necessary to mention such familiar examples of free poetical personification as the conflict of the *Δίκαιος* and the *Ἄδικος Λόγος* in the Clouds of Aristophanes, *Φθόνος* and *Ἐλεγχος* as dramatic personae in the New Comedy, *Ἀρετή* and *Κακία* in Xenophon's imitation of the myth of Prodikos, and the like.

A somewhat different view from the above is put forward by Engelhard (l. l., pp. 5, 24), who seeks to minimize the influence of the mythological fancy upon the development of Greek personification and to maintain the sharp distinction that Greek personification is a product of the pure poetical fancy, while the origin of Roman personification is to be found in the priestly

30 PERSONIFICATION AND USE OF ABSTRACT SUBJECTS

liturgy and in a natural tendency towards abstract ideas. While it is undoubtedly true that the free play of the poetic fancy is more characteristic of the Greeks and that abstract divinities have taken a stronger hold of the Roman mind, yet Engelhard's theory attaches too little importance to the part which mythological conceptions have played among the Greeks. Hence the distinction which he seeks to make, although it is not without some justification, can scarcely be accepted in the broad sense which he proposes.

Once established in poetry, the personification of abstract conceptions was easily introduced into the higher prose style. This happened naturally and almost unconsciously in the early Ionic prose, which was not yet sharply differentiated from the idioms of poetry. With the age of the sophists came tendencies towards keener reflection and closer self-questioning; hence the attempt was made to introduce new abstract ideas and to generalize the old ones more completely; the need was felt of creating an abstract terminology. Hence it is that abstract ideas and metaphysical agencies play so prominent a part in the speeches of Antiphon and Thukydides, and often appear to take the place of actual persons. So Campbell writes of abstract expressions in the time of Sophokles: 'Certain notions, which have a wide range of application, are more completely generalized then than in an earlier period, and have also more of a substantial or personal reality than would be attributed to them by a later writer. Such are νόμος, δίκη, καιρός, χρόνος.' (Intr. to Soph., I p. 91, 2nd ed.). In general we cannot doubt that the abstract terms which are the most common objects of mythological personification or of allegory have often directly influenced the development of the prose use of personification. Thus the following abstract ideas which are represented as divinities in poetry and the plastic art, are also found personified in the prose of Thuk. and the Orators, often showing the utmost freedom of use: ἀναΐδεια, δίκη, εἰρήνη, ἐλπίς, θάνατος, καιρός, λοιμός, πόλεμος, σωτηρία, τόλμα, τύχη, φήμη, φόβος, φρόνησις, χρόνος. In the following treatment the examples of personification are grouped according to the several authors. Not all the examples that involve personification will be cited here (Part I), but only the bolder and more striking cases in sufficient number to illustrate the usage of each author.

Thukydides introduces the personification of purely abstract qualities and powers into his speeches to a remarkable extent.

We can scarcely fail to see in this use traces of the influence of the poets and of the Gorgianic rhetoric, and we may compare

(a) Personification in Thukydides.

the fondness for poetical personification shown in the tetralogies of Antiphon, and to an immoderate extent, in the declamations attributed to Gorgias. This use agrees with the historian's careful analysis of human motives and character, with his introduction of philosophical arguments and with his striving after *σεμνότης*. The speeches plunge us into a world of abstractions, and we perceive that, regarding the passions as the mainspring of human action, Thukydides has introduced them also as actors in his history and assigned to them a great part in the production of events. Especially striking are the personifications of intelligence (*ξύνεσις*) affording safe warrant for Daring (2, 62, 5), of Science able, with the aid of Courage, to execute the lessons of Theory which it has learned (2, 87, 4)¹, of the Passions (*πενία*, *έξουσία*, *έρως*, *ελπίς*) leading men into unforeseen dangers (3, 45, 4 ff.), of just Vengeance (*τιμωρία*) seeking Redress (4, 62, 4), of Hope (*ελπίς*), luring to their ruin those who confide in their promises: 'Hope possesses a spendthrift's nature (*δάπανος φύσει*); those whom she has induced to stake their all on a single throw, she soon brings to utter ruin' (5, 103). Notable also is Thukydides' use of *ὁ παράλογος* (1, 78, 1, et al.) in place of *τὸ παράλογον*, 'the god of Miscalculation', as it were,—a use commented on by Phot. p. 282. On personification in Thuk., see also the remarks of Wilkins, *Manual of Gk. Comp.*, p. 24, Note,² and on his Psychology, see Prof. Shorey, *Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1893, p. 71 f. Still other examples are personifications of *ελευθερία*, *ἐμπειρία*, *εὐνοία*, *ἀμύνασθαι*, *τὸ πλεονεκτῆσαι*, *εὐπραγία*, *ισχύς*, *φόβος*. E. g. 2, 62, 3 *ελευθερίαν μὲν, ἣν διασώσωμεν, ῥαδίως ταῦτα ἀναληφομένην* (cf. Dem. 8, 42); 2, 62, 5 *τὴν τόλμαν ἢ ξύνεσις ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται, ἐλπίδι τε ἥσσον πιστεύει κτέ.*, cf. Soph. fr. 836 N. *ἀλλ' ἡ φρόνησις ἀγαθὴ θεὸς μέγας*, other

¹ 'Athenian science, your chief cause of alarm, will, no doubt, if seconded by courage, command the presence of mind needful to accomplish the manœuvres it has learnt.' Wilkins, *Speeches*, p. 87.

² 'We shall search in vain in Demosth. for any parallel to the passage, vii. 45, where Poverty, License, Hope, Love, Chance are personified and arrayed against each other. Cf. ii. 62, where Talent, personified, appears as an actor on the political arena. In v. 103, we find Hope again personified. By a still more ambitious development of the figure, Vengeance is personified, and even plays the injured party seeking redress, iv. 62.'

examples in Hense, p. 114 f.; 2, 89, 2 (ἐμπειρία); 3, 12, 1 (εὐνοια); 3, 38, 1 ἀμύνασθαι τῷ παθεῖν ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω καίμενον ἀντίπαλον μάλιστα τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀναλαμβάνει; 3, 45, 5 ἡ ἐλπίς καὶ ὁ ἔρως, ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν ἐκφροντίζων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν ὑποτιθεῖσα πλείστα βλάπτουσι κτέ., cf. Eur. Iph. A. 392 ἡ δὲ γ' ἐλπίς, οἶμαι μὲν, θεός, other examples in Hense, pp. 72, 99, 112; Preller, I 77, 1; 4, 62, 4 τιμωρία οὐκ εὐτυχεῖ δικαίως, ὅτι καὶ ἀδικεῖται· οὐδὲ ἰσχύς βέβαιον, διότι καὶ εὐελπι, cf. Ant. 2, γ, 1 ἡ ἀτυχία ἀδικεῖται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, and Th. 1, 123, 2 (σπονδαῖς) ἡδικημέναις βοηθήσετε; 4, 65, 4 ἡ εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχύς τῆς ἐλπίδος; 4, 86, 5 τὸ μὲν γὰρ (πλεονεκτῆσαι) ἰσχύος δικαίῳσι ἐπέρχεται. Compare also the use of the participle as an abstract noun in such phrases as τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, Th. 7, 68, 1; Ant. 2, γ, 3.

Especially noticeable in Thuk. is the frequent personification of πόλεμος, which is treated almost invariably as a personal notion,—an unaccountable Power, full of violence and caprice. E. g. 'War marches forward (χωρεῖ) upon no beaten path, but follows most often his own devices (ἀφ' αὐτοῦ τεχνᾶται); to have dealings (ὁμιλεῖν) with him is safe only for those who can keep their temper under strict control'—I, 122, 1, also πολέμῳ ὁμιλεῖν again in 6, 70, 1; I, 82 f.; 2, 36, 4; 3, 82, 3 ὁ δὲ πόλεμος βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς ὁμοῖοι; 6, 41, 3 ὅπλοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἷς ὁ πόλεμος ἀγάζεται; 6, 34, 2; 5, 5, 3; 4, 18, 2; 2, 59, 1. Similarly when Thuk. writes, 2, 36, 3: βάρβαρον ἢ Ἑλληνα πόλεμον, this use is to be explained simply as an extension of the familiar Ἑλληνα ἄνδρα; for it scarcely seems necessary here to delete πόλεμον with Classen or to correct to πολέμιον with Stahl. Cf. further the well-known personification of Πόλεμος as a noisy reveller in Ar. Ach. 980 ff., and for Apelles' painting representing Πόλεμος with his hands bound behind him, see K. O. Müller, Hdbch. d. Archäol. § 406, 2; Hense, p. 208.—Other noteworthy personifications in Thuk. of less abstract qualities are ὄρκος, λόγος, δύναμις, οἰκίαί, παραγγέλσεις, σπονδαί. E. g. 3, 83, 2 οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὁ διαλύσων οὔτε λόγος ἐχυρὸς οὔτε ὄρκος φοβερὸς; 1, 33, 2 αὕτη (ἡ δύναμις) πάρεστιν αὐτεπάγγελτος ἀνευ κινδύνων διδοῦσα ἑαυτήν; 1, 143, 5; 5, 66, 4; cf. 1, 123, 2.

In addition to examples which fall properly under the head of Personification,¹ Thuk. often uses abstract subjects in extremely forcible or picturesque phrases. E. g. 5, 72, 4 εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν, 'that the actual grasp of the Lacedaemonians

¹ For Th.'s use of abstract and collective substantives in the place of concrete, see Poppo Proleg. I 1, 104 and 259; Kohn, De usu adiectivorum, etc., ap. Thuk., p. 15.

might not overtake them in their flight' (Grote); 4, 128, 1 *πρὶν τὴν πλείονα κύκλωσιν σφῶν αὐτόσε προσμῖξαι*, 'their main force that was endeavoring to surround him', semi-collective use; 2, 49, 7 *τῶν ἀκρωτηρίων ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ ἐπεσήμαινε*; 1, 12, 2 *ἡ ἀναχώρησις χρονία γενομένη πολλὰ ἐνεόχμωσε*; 7, 11, 3 *ἀπανηλωκυίας τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν τειχῶν μέρος τι τοῦ ὀπλιτικοῦ*. See also under Judicial Verbs and Verbs of Wishing.

The usage of Antiphon is very similar to that of Thukydides, as seen in personifications of *δίκη*, *ὑποψία*, *ἐπιθυμία*, *φόβος*, *ἀδικία*,

(b) **Personification in Antiphon.** *κίνδυνος*, *αἰσχύνη*, *ἐμπειρία*, etc. Characteristic also is the formation of studied and poetical phrases with the genitive added for the sake of ornament,

as *ἡ ἀσθένεια τοῦ γήρως*, *ἡ ἀπειρία τῆς μέθης*, cf. remarks on p. 7. E. g. 2, α, 7 *ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς τιμωρίας ἀμνήμονα τῶν κινδύνων καθίστη αὐτὸν κτέ.*; 2, γ, 3 *τοῖς δὲ δ τε κίνδυνος ἢ τε αἰσχύνη ἀρκοῦσα ἦν σωφρονίσει τὸ θυμούμενον τῆς γνώμης*; 4, γ, 2 *τοὺς μὲν (νεωτέρους) ἢ τε μεγαλοφροσύνη τοῦ γένους ἢ τε ἀκμή τῆς ῥώμης ἐπαίρει τῷ θυμῷ χαρίζεσθαι κτέ.*; cf. 2, γ, 1 *ἡ ἀτυχία ἀδικεῖται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἦν προῖστάμενος τῆς κακουργίας ἀφανίσαι τὴν αὐτοῦ μαρίαν ζητεῖ*, 'Adversity herself is wronged by the accused, when he puts her forward to withdraw his own villainy from view' (Jebb, AO. I 28); *ἀτυχία* is also personified 2, δ, 1 ff. Bold metaphors are 2, γ, 10: *τὰ ἔχνη τῆς ὑποψίας εἰς τοῦτον φέροντα*; 2, δ, 10; 1, 13 *πειράσσομαι ὑμῖν διηγῆσασθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν· δίκη δὲ κυβερνήσειεν* (cf. Blass, I 130); for *δίκη* personified as a goddess, see Welcker, III 21 ff.; Preller, I 120; Hense, pp. 37, 93 f., 145, 200, 208.

Demosthenes' use of Personification is everywhere marked by the greatest practical power and vigor, thus illustrating those

(c) **Personification in Demosthenes.** qualities which the author *περὶ ὕψους* (15, 8) pronounces most essential to the oratorical imagination. Hence it is characteristic of the orator's vehement earnestness that he often appeals to

the *facts* for justification and support, in much the same way that Thukydides, his great exemplar, never wearies of enforcing the contrast between word and deed. For the underlying thought the orator is clearly indebted to his predecessor, but his own genius has struck out new and varied forms of expression for this most persistent of commonplaces. Hence *τὸ πρᾶγμα*, *τὰ πεπραγμένα*, *τὸ ἔργον* (*αὐτό*) are personified by Demosthenes nearly twenty-five times in the nominative; *τὸ πρᾶγμα* the more readily lends itself to personification, as it was never degraded to so trite a use as characterizes *res* in Latin. This use affords a typical example of

Demosthenic personification, which, with the simplest linguistic material, produces the most complete and irresistible effects. Demosthenes often prepares the way for his personifications by a species of paronomasia, first placing the verb in its proper use of a person, and then, with great effect, transferring it to the personified thing; cf. Hermog. π. ιδ. β' § 326, Sp. II 367, Blass III¹ 166. E. g. 4, 38 εἰ, ὅσα ἂν τις ὑπερβῇ τῇ λόγῳ, καὶ τὰ πράγματα ὑπερβήσεται, δεῖ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δημηγορεῖν; 14, 23 f. αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐναντὶ εὐρήσει; 18, 4 f. ὅ τι ἂν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ ἀναγκάσῃ; 18, 239 οὐχ ὅσα ἐβουλόμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅσα δοίη τὰ πράγματ' ἔδει δέχεσθαι; 19, 117. 296; 19, 120 τίς μου καταμαρτυρεῖ; τὰ πράγματ', Αἰσχίνη, ἅπερ πιστότατ' ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἔνεστ' εἰπεῖν ὥς ἡ πεπεισμένα ἢ χαριζόμενά τῳ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, 'The witnesses against you, Aischines, are your own acts, which you cannot accuse of having been bribed or of seeking to gain any man's favor', cf. Ar. Rhet. 1, 15, 1376 α οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατηῖσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἀλίσκεται ψευδομαρτυρίῳ κτέ., 'Probabilities cannot be bribed to deceive and are never convicted of perjury'; 22, 53 δν οὐδ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δίκην λαμβάνειν ἐὰ τὰ πεπραγμένα καὶ βεβιωμένα; 23, 56 οὐ γένος ἐστὶ φιλιῶν καὶ πολεμιῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ πραττόμενα ἐξεργάζεται τούτων ἑκάτερον; 23, 13 τὰ πραχθέντα αὐτὰ κατηγορεῖ (δοι κτέ.), cf. Lys. 27, 8 τούτων τὰ μὲν πράγματα κατηγορεῖ, ἡμεῖς δὲ καταμαρτυροῦμεν (the only example of the kind occurring in Lys.); 19, 167 τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ πεπραγμέν' αὐτὰ δηλώσει; ib. 196 f. 157 f. 212; 21, 110; 57, 25; 55, 14; 21, 9 ὥς τὸ πρᾶγμ' αὐτὸ μαρτυρεῖ; 24, 16; 19, 81 ἡ γὰρ ἀλήθεια καὶ τὰ πεπραγμένα αὐτὰ βοᾷ, 'There is no need for hirelings to shout aloud; the truth, the facts themselves shout aloud'; cf. 19, 119 ταῦτ' οὐ φανερά; ταῦτ' οὐχὶ βοᾷ καὶ λέγει ὅτι κτέ. The acme of rhetorical boldness is reached when Demosthenes places subjects of the thing with ἀποκτείνειν, as he does twice in the Oration on the False Embassy, one of the most impassioned of all his speeches: 19, 131 ἐλθὼν ἐκέισε ἐτέρων θανάτων ἄξια ποιῶν πέφανται τὰ δὲ πρόσθεν πεπραγμένα ἀποκτείνειεν ἂν αὐτὸν δικαίως, 'Your former misdeeds would kill you, if justice were done'; ib. 179 δύο τῶν πεπραγμένων ἔσθ' ἱκανὰ αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνειν; cf. Hom. M 46 ἀγνοοῖ δέ μιν (sc.λέοντα) ἔκτα. Less forcible is ἀπόλλυμι, cf. Lys. 25, 5; Soph. Ant. 875.

Of other personifications which contribute to the general dignity and elevation of Demosthenic style, only some of the more notable need be cited here. In the more abstract sphere we find personifications of ἀλήθεια, ἐλευθερία, τὸ τῆς φύσεως βάρβαρον, τὸ συνειδέναι, δικαιοσύνη, πράξεις χρησταί κτέ., φύσις, χρόνος, ἄτη, ποτηρία. E. g. 18, 250 ὄνομα, δ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ πᾶσι βεβαιούσαν (ἑώρα), 19, 81; Aisch.

1, 84; 2, 66; 8, 42 οὐκ οὐκ βούλεται τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καιροῖς τὴν παρ' ὑμῶν ἐλευθερίαν ἐφεδρεῖν, Th. 2, 62, 3; 21, 150 τὸ τῆς φύσεως βάρβαρον ἀληθῶς καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθρὸν ἔλκει καὶ βιάζεται, 'The savagery and barbarity of his real character carry him completely away and force him to reveal himself', cf. Aisch. 1, 95 (ἡ βδελυρὰ φύσις); 19, 210 ἐπελαμβάνετο αὐτῆς τὸ συνειδέναι; 20, 165 ἐν μὲν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ Λεπτίνης πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀγωνίζεται, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑμῶν ἐκάστου γνώμῃ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς κακίαν κτέ. . . ἀντιτάσσεται; 20, 49 πράξεις χρησταὶ κτέ. . . ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον προῆγον; 8, 72 ἐπ' ἐκείνο (sc. τὸ ῥᾶστον) ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ βαδιεῖται, 'Nature herself will take the road to what is easy'; 18, 275 ταῦτα ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ διώρικεν, (on the late development of the philosophical meaning 'universal nature,' see Campbell, *Intr. Soph.*, I 91); cf. Th. 3, 64, 4 ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ἐβούλετο, Aisch. 2, 152; 19, 248 (ἡ ἄτη); 22, 13 οὐδ' ὁ χρόνος τὴν μνήμην ἀφελέσθαι δύναται,—a frequent phrase in the panegyrists, cf. Aisch. 3, 222; [Lys.] 2, 54; [Isokr.] 1, 8. 2. χρόνος as an abstract subject is freely used in Dem., as 16, 29; 18, 310; 20, 130; Isokr. 14, 41. Cf. *Soph. El.* 179 χρόνος γὰρ εὐμαρὴς θεός; other examples in Hense, p. 111.

There are cases in which it becomes difficult to determine whether an abstract substantive is to be regarded as having acquired a concrete sense or as offering an example of personification. E. g. Dem. 19, 339 πονηρία δυνάμει δόξαν εὐρομένη παρ' ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐστίν, 'Knavery gaining influence is injurious to the welfare of the state'. Here there may be reasonable doubt whether we have to do with a case of personification (cf. Hense, p. 112), or whether πονηρία in Demosthenes has become a synonym of οἱ πονηροί. On this whole question see O. Riemann, *Études sur Tite-Live*, p. 71 f., and on the use of the abstract for the concrete, see Gildersleeve, *Gk. Syntax*, § 41; Kühner-Gerth, II¹ p. 11; Campbell, *Sophocles*, I p. 94. Similar examples to the above are Dein. 2, 3 f. πονηρίαν ἀρχομένην μὲν κωλύσαι ἂν τις δυνηθείη, ἐγκαταγεγρακυῖαν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι; Isokr. 10, 6 ἔστι δ' ἡ περὶ τὰς ἐριδας φιλοσοφία δυναμένη (χρηματίζεσθαι); Plat. *Lach.* 198, e ἡ στρατηγία οἵεται δεῖν ἄρχειν (τῆς μαντικῆς). This collective use of the abstract is a favorite one with such an English writer as Carlyle: 'Rascality has slipped its muzzle and bays, three-throated' (*French Rev.*, I p. 349, in *Collected Works*, London, 1874), 'Copiously escorted by Hunger and Rascality' (p. 328), 'Patriotism rushes in tumultuous, rummaging distractedly for arms' (p. 233), 'Conceive the blank face of Patriotism when it found, etc.' (p. 226).—On the other hand there can be no question of the concrete meaning

in such words as *βοήθεια* (Th. 6, 102, 3 *βοήθεια ἤδη ἐπαγγίει*), *πρεσβεία* (5, 31, 1), *νεότης* (2, 8, 1), *παρουσία* (6, 86, 3), *ξυμμαχία* (1, 130 f.), *δουλεία* (5, 23, 2).

More concrete terms personified by Demosthenes are *ἡμέρα*, *ψήφισμα*, *ῥῆμα*, *πράγμα* ('trouble'), *νόσημα*, and especially the terms which are common objects of personification in poetry and the plastic art, viz., *καιρός*, *εἰρήνη*, *πόλεμος*. E. g. 'Opportunity freely gives, but requires a strict account from the recipients of her gifts; she calls aloud and speaks with audible voice': 4, 12 οὐδὲ δίδόντων τῶν καιρῶν Ἀμφίπολιν δέξασθαι δύναισθ' ἄν; 1, 2 ὁ παρὼν καιρὸς μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφίεις, ὅτι κτέ. (see Sandys and Rehd. ad loc., and Rehd. Ind.¹ Personifikation); 18, 172 ἐκείνος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη εὖνον ἄνδρα ἐκάλει ('cried out for, called aloud for'); often personified also in the oblique cases, as 18, 189 ὑπεύθυνον τοῖς πεισθεῖσι, τῇ τύχῃ, τοῖς καιροῖς, 19, 302 προδεδωκότι συμμάχους καὶ φίλους καὶ καιροῦς; for the altar of *Καιρός* at Olympia and the representation of this personification in plastic art by Lysippos, see E. Curtius, Arch. Ztg. 1875, pp. 1-8; Hense, p. 207; Welcker, III 230.—19, 275 τὴν αὐτὴν εἰρήνην τὰ μὲν τῶν συμμάχων τείχη καθηρηκυῖαν, τὰς δὲ τῶν πρέσβεων οἰκίας οἰκοδομοῦσαν κτέ., 'The peace at the same time has destroyed the fortresses of your allies and is building the houses of your ambassadors' (Blass, III¹ 87); 19, 146 τὴν εἰρήνην τοῖς (πρέσβεσι) πλοῦτον εἰργάσθαι, cf. And. 3, 7; for *Εἰρήνη* as a goddess in the poets, cf. Hense, pp. 111, 200; Welcker, III 221 f.; Preller, I 393 f.—18, 89 ὁ τότε πόλεμος ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀφθονωτέροις διῆγεν ὑμᾶς; 4, 44 εὐρήσει τὰ σαθρὰ τῶν ἐκείνου πραγμάτων αὐτὸς ὁ πόλεμος; cf. Isokr. 8, 19; Aisch. 3, 148 f.; Th. 1, 122, 1; Hdt. 7, 144 οὗτος ὁ πόλεμος συστάς ἔσωσε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.—18, 188 (τὸ ψήφισμα); 38, 59 τοιούτους ἀπάντων ἐκλύει τῶν δεινῶν τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα (this word 'acquittal'); 18, 153 ὥσπερ χειμάρρους ἂν ἅπαν τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσέπεσε.—Finally the extended allegory may be cited by which Dem. compares the universal corruption of Greece to a widespread epidemic: 19, 259 ff. νόσημα γὰρ δεινὸν ἐμπίπτωκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα . . . εἰς Πελοπόννησον δ' εἰσελθὼν τὰς ἐν Ἡλίδι σφαγὰς πεποίηκε, καὶ μανίας ἐνέπλησε τοὺς τालαιώρους ἐκείνους κτέ.; compare the very similar account of the breaking out of the great plague in Th. 2, 47-53, and for the personification of *λοιμός*, v. Hense, p. 109.

As has already been stated (p. 7), Demosthenes is especially fond of the sharp and lively tone which is produced by the neuter pronoun as subject (τοῦτο, ταῦτα, cf. ὅπερ; for a similar use in

Tacitus, v. Meyer, l. l., p. 12 f.). The indefinite demonstrative suggests a vague notion out of which agency may arise and is rendered more effective by 'the added mystery of the neuter'. Thus of the unconquerable principle which maintained the freedom of Greece: 9, 36 *ἦν τι τότε ἐν ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν διανοαίσις, δ νῦν οὐκ ἔστιν, δ καὶ τοῦ Περσῶν ἐκράτησε πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθέραν ἤγε τὴν Ἑλλάδα κτέ.* (v. Sandys ad loc., and Rehd. Ind.³, Res pro rei defectu. Rehd. speaks of the pronoun 'which as it were personifies the expected answer'.) 19, 208 *τοῦτ' (sc. τὸ συνειδέναι) ἀποστρέφει τὴν γλῶτταν, ἐμφράττει τὸ στόμα, ἄγχει, σιωπᾶν ποιεῖ*; 21, 72; 21, 89 *δάκνει καὶ τοῦτο, ὅταν κτέ.*; 19, 289 *οὐδὲ φοβεῖ με Φίλιππος, ἀλλ' εἰ . . . , ταῦτα φοβεῖ με*; 23, 204 *τοῦτ' (sc. τὸ δίκην λαμβάνειν) ἐξελήλυθεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως.* Also a favorite turn with Dem. is the periphrasis with the participle as seen in the foll.: 21, 67 *τὸ πάντας ποιοῦν φιλοτιμείσθαι ἐκείν' ἐστίν, ὅτι κτέ.*; 16, 27; 23, 8.

Demosthenes and Aischines make use of personification with nearly equal frequency, and many of the metaphors of Aischines

do not fall behind those of Demosthenes in (d) Personification in Aischines. vigorous effect, yet in others a noticeable difference is to be observed. Personifications are

never employed by Dem. except for the sake of more forcible expression; those of Aisch. often lack this robust character and show an attempt at ostentatious display, which betrays the former tragic actor. We are often reminded of the criticism of Hermogenes (π. ιδ., β, 11) that the language of Aisch. is brilliant and splendid rather than chaste and forcible. Apostrophe is also a form of personification, and here belongs the bombastic oath in the peroration of the Ctesiphontea: *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὃ γῆ καὶ ἡλιε καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ σύνεσις καὶ παιδεία* (ridiculed by Dem. 18, 127). Among personifications of this kind may be mentioned those of *κίνδυνος*, *καιρός*, *ἔρως*, ἡ τῶν δημοσίων γραμμάτων φυλακή, *στάσις*, *σωτηρία*, *καιρός καὶ φόβος*, *φήμη*. E. g. 2, 159 *μετακαλεῖ τὴν (τοῦ κρινομένου) ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς ὁ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας λόγους κτέ.*; 1, 192 f. *οὐχ ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' ὁ καιρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐξοργεῖ*; 1, 140 *Ἀρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα ὁ σώφρων ἔρως τοιοῦτους ἐπαίδευσεν*; 3, 75 *καλόν, ὃ Ἀ., ἡ τῶν δημοσίων γραμμάτων φυλακή*. . . . *ἀπέδωκε τῷ δήμῳ συνιδεῖν τοὺς πάλαι πονηροὺς*, 'The preservation of the public records secures to the people the means of distinguishing between honest men and knaves'; 2, 132 *αὐτοὺς καθείλεν ἡ τοῖς στρατοπέδοις συνήθως παρακολουθοῦσα στάσις*; 3, 159 *καταγαγούσης αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν πόλιν τῆς ἀπροσδοκῆτου σωτηρίας* (for *σωτηρία* worshipped as a goddess, v. Welcker, III 224; cf. Th. 5, 112, 2

τῇ σφζούσῃ τύχῃ); 3, 141 ὁ δ' εἰσάγων ἦν ὑμᾶς εἰς τὰς Θήβας καιρὸς καὶ φόβος καὶ χρεία συμμαχίας, ἀλλ' οὐ Δημοσθένης, 'Opportunity, Fear and Need secured you the Theban alliance, not Demosthenes'; ib. 239 (same subjects repeated): cf. Hdt. 7, 173 ἀρρωδίῃ ἦν τὸ πείθον; [Lys.] 2, 29 ἀμφοτέρα δ' ἦν τὰ πείθοντα, κέρδος καὶ δέος; for the widely recognized god Φόβος, v. Welcker, I 714, III 222 f.; Usener, Götternamen, 367 f. The most extended personification in Aisch. is that of Rumor in the Timarchea, §§ 127-129, where the orator personifies φήμη as a goddess and invokes her as a witness against the character of Timarchos: περὶ τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον ἀψεудῆς τις πλανᾶται φήμη κατὰ τὴν πόλιν κτέ., 'Rumor as a truthful witness wanders through the city, telling of the actions of men. The ancient Athenians set up an altar to her as a great goddess, and only evil-doers refuse to acknowledge her divinity (οὐ τιμῶσι τὴν θεὸν ταύτην)'. Blass justly remarks (III² 228) that the latter part of this passage is scarcely in keeping with oratorical style; in fact, the whole digression is evidently drawn from Homer and other poets; for the personification of φήμη and ὄσσα in the poets, v. Hes. Op. 760; Hense, pp. 108, 115; Welcker, I 715, III 220. Similarly Carlyle has taken the figure of Rumor from Homer: 'Everywhere foolish Rumour babbles not of what was done, but of what was misdone' (French Rev. I 34); 'the mad voice of Rumour' (I 211).

Worthy of all praise are the personifications of τὸ αἰσχρὸν, βδελυρὰ φύσις, ὄρκος, ἡδοναί, τὰ δημόσια, χρήματα, πόλεμος. E. g. 3, 155 οὐ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αἰσχρὸν σιωπήσεται, ἀλλὰ τάναντία δόξει φθέγγεσθαι, ὅτι κτέ., 'The shameful truth will not remain silent, but will cry out', for the προσωποποιία, cf. Dem. 1, 2; 19, 81. 119; Aisch. 1, 95 ἢ βδελυρὰ φύσις ἢ τούτου ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπεθύμει, καὶ ἕτερον ἐφ' ἐτέρῃ ἐπίταγμα ἐπέταττεν κτέ.; 3, 233 ὁ ὄρκος, ὃν ὁμωμοκῶς δικάζει, συμπαρακολουθῶν αὐτὸν λυπεῖ (Weidner compares Xen. Hier. 6, 6); 1, 191 αἱ προπετεῖς ἡδοναὶ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἱκανὸν ἡγεῖσθαι, ταῦτα πληροὶ τὰ ληστήρια, ταῦτ' εἰς ἱπακτροκέλητα ἐμβιβάζει, 'It is not the Furies, but unchecked sensual lusts and insatiate desires that stock the robber's den and man the pirate's ship', cf. Vergil's *mala mentis Gaudia*, Aen. 6, 279; 3, 246 οὐ τὰ διδασκαλεῖα μόνον παιδεύει τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ πολλὸν μᾶλλον τὰ δημόσια; 2, 131 τὸ αὐτὸ (sc. τὰ χρήματα) ἡβξήσῃ τε τὰ πράγματα καὶ καθεῖλε; 3, 148 f. οὐ ρήτωρ ἀστράτευτος ἀλλ' ὁ Φωκικὸς πόλεμος αὐτοὺς ἐπαίδενσε.

In view of his careful avoidance of bold metaphors, Isokrates does not offer proportionally as many clearly marked personifica-

tions as Dem. or Aisch., though the number is greatly increased in several of the later speeches, such as the De

(e) Personification in Isokrates. Pace and the Philippos. Some examples of personification in Isokr. have already been cited

(pp. 19, 21 f.); v. also Gehlert, *De elocutione Isokr.*, p. 32. Other striking cases are the personifications of *καιρός*, *τὸ συμφέρον*,

τὰ κακά, *τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐτῶν*, *κίνδυνος*, *μίσος*, *ἐχθρα*, *ὄνομα*, *πλοῦτος*, *ἰσχύς*, *κάλλος*, *γῆρας*, *πράξεις*, *πόλεμος*, *ἀρχή*, *ἐξουσία*, *δύναμις*. E. g. 4, 160 (*παρακελεύεται*) *πολεμῖν ὁ παρὼν καιρός*; 5, 137; 5, 45 *σοῦ μὲν ἐπιστά- τοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ συμφέροντος πείθοντος, τῶν δὲ παρόντων κακῶν ἀναγκαζόντων*;

3, 43 *οὐχ ἥκιστα κάκεινο παρεκάλεσεν, ὅτι κτέ.*; 8, 145 *ἐμοὶ ἀμφοτέρα συμβουλεύει παύσασθαι, καὶ τὸ μῆκος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐτῶν*;

14, 60 *κίνδυνον δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας Ἑλλήνας ἡλευθέρωσεν*, 'You undertook a struggle which established the liberties of all Greece'; 7, 8 *τοῦ μίσους καὶ τῆς ἐχθρας . . .*, ἃ τότε κατεπολέμησεν ἡμᾶς; 5, 104 *ἦν τοῦτομα τοῦτο* (sc. *τῆς ἐλευθερίας*) *διασπείρης, ὅπερ εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας εἰσπεσὼν καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν καὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχὴν κατέλυσεν*, 'Many will revolt, if you promise them freedom, and scatter broadcast in Asia this word which, falling on the soil of Hellas, has broken up our empire as well as that of the Lacedaemonians'; 8, 83 *τὸν πλοῦτον θαυμάζοντες, δὲ ἀδίκως εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθὼν καὶ τὸν δικαίως ὑπάρξαντα ἐμελλε προσαπολεῖν*;

5, 15 *πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, ἃ καὶ πείθειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι πέφυκεν*; 10, 16 *τῷ μὲν ἰσχὺν ἔδωκεν, ἣ τῶν ἄλλων κρατεῖν δύναται, τῇ δὲ κάλλος, ὃ καὶ τῆς βώμης ἀρχειν πέφυκεν*;

Ep. 3, 6 (*τὸ γῆρας*) *προήγαγεν εἰς τοῦτό μου τὸν βίον*; 5, 71 *τῶν πράξεων τὰς φέρειν ἅμα δυναμένας ἡδονὰς τε καὶ τιμὰς*;

8, 19 *ὁ πόλεμος ἁπάντων ἡμᾶς ἀπεστέρηκεν* 'καὶ γὰρ πενεστέρους πεποίηκε, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας διαβέβηκε κτέ.

By far the most elaborate and extended personification in Isokr. occurs in the speech on the Peace, where the orator describes through long paragraphs the misfortunes which the pursuit of Empire

has brought upon the Greeks: 'It is Empire (*ἡ ἀρχή*, *ἡ ἐξουσία*) which has ruined both the Athenian state and the Lacedaemonian. It fills individual citizens with a spirit of injustice and states with a spirit of presumption. It drives mad those who become enamored of it and in its real nature resembles nothing so much as the courtesan who lures men to ruin. It should be hated and shunned as the occasion of all evil' (8, 105 *πῶς οὐ χρὴ μισεῖν καὶ φεύγειν τὴν πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ ποιεῖν ἐπάρασαν*);. See 8, 64. 77 ff. 94 ff. 103 ff., and cf. Ar. Av. 1536 ff., where *Βασίλεια*, the all-powerful handmaid of Zeus, becomes the bride of *Peithetairos*.

Examples from the remaining orators occur with *θάνατος*, *ἔρως*,

ἔχθρα, συγγένεια, αἰσχύνη, εἰρήνη, ψῆφος, ἀγών. E. g. [Lys.] 2, 66 οὐ τοὺς πονηροὺς ὑπερορᾷ (ὁ θάνατος), ἀλλ' ἴσον ἑαυτὸν παρέχει
 (f) Personifica- πᾶσιν, for the personification of θάνατος, v. Hense,
 tion in the Re- p. 145; Usener, Götternamen, p. 368; Welcker,
 maining Orators. III 223; Lys. Ἐρωτ. ap. Plat. Phaidr. 233, b
 τοιαῦτα ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται κτέ.; Hyp. 5, 2 οὕτως ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν
 ἔρως, προσλαβὼν γυναικὸς κακίαν; Lys. Ἐρωτ. frg. 261 τὴν ἐμὴν εὐνοίαν
 μὴδ' ἂν τὴν Ἐμπεδοκλείους ἔχθραν ἰσχυῖσαι διαστήσῃ, 'Not the Principle
 of Enmity itself could dissolve our friendship'. (Jebb, I 312).
 Lysias in the Orations has scarcely a case of the personification
 of a pure abstract, but a number of examples of Periphrasis, see
 under that head.—Isai. 1, 39 ἡμᾶς καὶ ἡ συγγένεια καὶ ἡ παρ' ὑμῶν
 αἰσχύνη ἠνάγκαζεν ἂν; And. 3, 7 αὕτη ἡ εἰρήνη τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων
 ὑψηλὸν ἤρε; id. 1, 105 ἡ ψῆφος ἡ ὑμετέρα κρινεῖ, πότερον κτέ. (cf. p. 18
 above); Dein. 1, 107; Lyk. 7 ὁ νῦν ἐνεστηκὼς ἀγὼν ἀείμνηστον κατα-
 λείψει τοῖς ἐπιγιννομένοις τὴν κρίσιν κτέ.; cf. Hyp. 6, 42 (epilogue)
 οἱ παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔπαινοι παῖδες αὐτῶν ἀθάνατοι ἔσσονται . . . ἡ τῆς
 πατρίδος εὐνοία ἐπίτροπος αὐτοῖς τῶν παίδων καταστήσεται; for a striking
 case of προσωποποιία, v. Hyp. frg. 215.

Besides this treatment of general usage, it will be convenient to notice separately the use of certain special terms. These are chiefly *τύχη*, a very familiar personification, and *ψυχή*, *γνώμη*, etc., which occur only in elevated language.

τύχη, 'Fortune', is far more free and varied in its use as a subject than any other purely abstract term. The worship of the goddess *τύχη* is treated of by Welcker, II (g) *τύχη*. 799-810, III 210-213; Preller, I 441 f.; Hense, pp. 38, 99, 114, 120, 191. As Welcker, II 799 ff., points out, Fortune was conceived by the earlier Greeks as a mysterious instrument of the divine government (*τύχη θεοῦ*). It is still in this sense that Plato says in the Laws (4, 709, b) that God and, together with God, fortune and opportunity rule human affairs. Later as the spirit of unquestioning belief gradually declined, Tyche constantly gained in importance and general currency at the expense of the gods of the old mythology until she is finally called by Menander (482, K.) mistress of the world and the only 'providence of the gods'. The Orators naturally represent the second stage of Greek thought, in which Tyche is the goddess of every-day life, a sort of popular name for the divinity. Lysias, who has no purely abstract subjects, uses *τύχη* freely. E. g. Lys. 12, 80 μὴ τῆς τύχης, ἡ τούτους παρέδωκε τῇ πόλει, κάκιον ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς

βοηθήσῃ; 13, 63 οὗς ἡ τύχη καὶ ὁ δαίμων περιεποίησε; 18, 22; 24, 22; Isokr. 7, 23 ἐν τῇ κληρώσει τὴν τύχην βραβεύσειν; 9, 59 τὴν τύχην αὐτῷ συναγωνιζομένην; 5, 152; 6, 47; 5, 44; Dem. 4, 12 τὰ τῆς τύχης, ἥπερ αἰεὶ βέλτιον ἢ ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμεθα; 4, 45; 9, 38; 14, 36; 18, 67. 253. 306 f.; Aisch. 2, 183; 3, 115. 157 f.; Ant. 1, 2; Dein. 1, 29. 32. 33. 65. 77. 98; 3, 16; Th. 3, 45, 6. 86, 5; 4, 18, 4; 5, 112, 2; 7, 68, 1.

In marked contrast to the frequent Latin use of *animus* and *mens*, personifications of the words denoting the 'soul' or 'mind'

(b) ψυχή, γνώμη. (ψυχή, διάνοια, δόξα, γνώμη) are quite rare in ordinary Greek prose, and belong only to elevated or highly poetical language. E.g. Ant. 5, 93 τὸ σῶμα ἀπειρηκὸς ἡ ψυχὴ συνεξίσωσεν, ἐθέλουσα τάλαιπωρεῖν κτέ.; 4, α, 7 τὴν βουλευσασαν ψυχὴν ἀνταφελίσθαι αὐτόν; cf. 2, γ, 3; Isokr. 15, 189 τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν ψυχὴν μαθεῖν δυναμένην; 8, 39; Dem. 18, 309 ἐκ ψυχῆς τὰ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέροντα προηρημένης; 19, 210 οὐ προσήει πρὸς ταῦθ' ἡ διάνοια, ἀλλ' ἀνεδύετο; Aisch. 3, 170; Th. 3, 43, 5; 5, 111, 5. Isokr. has also the foll. metaphorical phrases: 5, 24 ἡσυχάζουσιν ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν; 15, 265 μὴ πεπλανημένην ἔχειν τὴν δ.; 8, 28 (τὰς δόξας) στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ δέοντος δυναμένης.

We may note that a periphrasis for the actual living person is also formed by σῶμα, as Dein. 1, 38 ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὧν ἔτι καὶ νῦν ζῇ τὰ σώματα; Lyk. 115; Isokr. 10, 51. Parts of the body are very rarely personified in the Orators, but cf. Ant. 4, γ, 4 (χεῖρες); Isokr. 5, 81; 15, 189 (φωνή).

Several special classes of verbs, when used metaphorically of things, commonly carry with them a high degree of Personification, and may be conveniently brought together at the end of the present section. Such verbs are chiefly verbs of witnessing, accusing, and condemning, drawn from the legal language, verbs of assisting, such as συναγωνίζεσθαι, drawn from the military sphere, verbs of wishing, verbs of dying and of growing old.

(1) Verbs of witnessing (μαρτυρεῖν, συμμαρτυρεῖν, καταμαρτυρεῖν), borrowed originally from the technical language of the law-courts,

(i) Judicial Verbs. have become very familiar in all spheres of Greek style, and are sometimes little more than synonyms of the common verbs of showing. E. g.

Dem. 24, 16 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τυῦργον αὐτό; 21, 9; 5, 9; 20, 130 μαρτυρεῖ πᾶς ὁ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνου γεγονώς, cf. Hyp. 2, 14 and Xen. Hell. 2, 3, 2; Aisch. 2, 64; Isokr. Ep. 2, 12; 4, 31 τὰ πάλοι ῥηθέντα τοῖς παροῦσιν

ἔργοις συμμαρτυρεῖ, 'Ancient story bears witness in support of present deeds'; Lys. frg. 41; 13, 28 αὐτὸ τὸ ψήφισμα σοῦ καταμαρτυρήσει; 13, 50; Isai. 4, 19; Ant. 2, β, 8 τὰ εἰκότα καταμαρτυρήσαί μοῦ; Dem. 29, 9. 7; 19, 120. See also Rehd. Dem. Ind.² μαρτυρεῖν.—With the use of the verb compare the bolder personifications through the substantive μάρτυς: Dem. 19, 177 ἐπέδειξα μάρτυσι τοῖς γεγενημένοις αὐτοῖς, οὐ λόγοις χρώμενος; Isokr. 9, 22 μάρτυρας ἂν τις ποιήσαιτο τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἐν οἷς ἐκεῖνος ἐκρατίστευσεν, where Blass' correction to τοὺς θεασαμένους τοὺς ἀγῶνας seems unnecessary; [Lys.] 2, 63 μάρτυρας τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων τάφους παρέχονται; cf. Ar. Vesp. 937 μάρτυρας παρῆναι τρύβλιον, δοῖδουκα, τυρόκηστιν κτέ.; Th. 1, 73, 2; Aisch. 1, 130; Hyp. 2, 14; Gorg. Palam. 15; Ar. Rhet. 1, 15. For μάρτυς and μαρτύρομαι in the poets, v. Hense, Beseel. Person., 10 ff.

(2) Similarly used are verbs of accusing (κατηγορεῖν, διαβάλλειν), of denouncing or informing against (μηνῦειν, ἀποφαίνειν), of convicting, condemning and punishing (ἐλέγχειν, αἰρεῖν, ἐγκαταλαμβάνειν, κατακρίνειν, καταψηφίζεσθαι), of acquitting and clearing (ἀφιέναι, ἀπολύειν, ἐκλύειν, σφάζειν). E. g. Isokr. 15, 312 τὴν μὲν (συκοφαντίαν) κατηγοροῦσαν, τὴν δὲ (φιλοσοφίαν) κρινομένην; Aisch. 1, 129; Lys. 27, 8 (v. p. 34); Dem. 23, 13 τὰ πραχθέντα αὐτὰ κατηγορεῖ; 45, 20 f.; Th. 2, 18, 3 κατὰ τὴν πορείαν ἢ σχολαιότης διέβαλεν αὐτόν, μάλιστα δὲ ἢ ἐν τῇ Οἰνόῃ ἐπίσχεσις, 'Archidamos' loitering on the march and most of all his halt at Oinoe damaged his reputation'; Ant. 4, δ, 2 αὐτὴ ἢ ἡλικία τῶν νέων κατέκρινεν (ἄν); 3, β, 8; 2, α, 5 αὐτὸς ὁ θάνατος ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἀποθανόντα μηνύει αὐτόν; 2, β, 4; 4, β, 6; 3, δ, 10; Dem. 19, 121 οὐδὲν ἐστὶν δ τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ αὐτόν ἐξελέγξει; 55, 14; Th. 6, 86, 1; Aisch. 2, 24 αἰρεῖ αὐτόν οὐχ ἢ κατηγορία ἢ ἐμῇ, ἀλλὰ τὰ δημόσια γράμματα; 2, 60; Dem. 37, 47; 19, 117 (τὸ πᾶγμα); 19, 296 μή μοι σφζέσθω μηδεῖς, ἂν ὁ δεῖνα βούληται, ἀλλ' ὃν ἂν τὰ πεπραγμένα σφζῃ; 19, 91; 37, 59 f.; 20, 47; cf. Dein. 3, 20.

A metaphor which always raises abstract conceptions to the dignity of persons is συναγωνίζεσθαι, 'to fight on the same side, be

an ally'. E. g. Dem. 4, 45 τὸ τῶν θεῶν εὐμενὲς ἡμῖν (j) συναγωνίζεσθαι, συναγωνίζεται; 18, 20 τί συναγωνίσαστο αὐτῷ; ἢ τῶν ἄλλων σύμμαχος.

Ἑλλήνων (ἄγνοια); Ant. 5, 93 (τὸ δίκαιον); Isokr. 9, 59; 5, 26. 45. The adjective σύμμαχος has a similar use: Ant. 5, 86 οἱ ἀγῶνες τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ σύμμαχοί εἰσι, τῇ δὲ διαβολῇ πολεμιώτατοι; ib. 37 (ἢ ἀλήθεια); ib. 43 (τὸ εἰκός); Isokr. 14, 40 (τὸ δίκαιον); [Lys.] 2, 10; ib. 62 (ὄρκοι); cf. Dem. 4, 6; Th. 4, 10, 3 τοῦ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον ξύμμαχον γίγνεται; Hdt. 7, 6; 7, 239 (τὸ οἰκός); cf. also ἐπίκουρος: Th. 3, 67, 1. See Roschatt, l. l., p. 41, and Hense, Beseel.

Person., II 19. The opposite of *σύμμαχος* is *πολέμιος*: Ant. 5, 86. 93; 3, γ, 6; Lyk. frg. 96 (*τὰ εὐτυχήματα*).

Some examples of *βούλεσθαι* used of abstracts have already been given, p. 19. Other bold and striking uses occur, especially

(k) Verbs of
Wishing. in Thuk. E. g. Dem. 18, 317 ἡ ἐμὴ πολιτεία ταῖς τῶν τότε ἐπαινουμένων ταῦτα βουλομένη φανήσεται; Th. 3, 64, 4 ἀ δὲ ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ἐβούλετο ἐξηλέγχθη, cf. 3, 45 f.; 3, 14, 2 οἷους τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος βούλεται. Bold but by no means unparalleled is Th. 5, 65, 2 ἐπεβόησεν ὅτι διανοεῖται κακὸν κακῷ ἴασθαι, δηλῶν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως τὴν παρούσαν ἄκαιρον προθυμίαν ἀνάληψιν βουλομένην εἶναι. Here Classen and Stahl, after v. Herw. and Mein., read *βουλόμενον*, but the correction is quite unnecessary, as Jowett observes, especially in view of Thuk.'s great fondness for personification; cf. also Isokr. 15, 13. 195 (p. 19). For Lys. 29, 6, see p. 48.

Similarly *ἐθέλειν*—especially with the negative, *οὐκ ἐθέλω*—is common in Hdt., v. Merriam on Hdt. 6, 37, 10, and in the poets; cf. Eur. Hipp. 857 ἦδε δέλτος θέλει τι σημῆναι νέον; Hom. Φ 366; Solon 4, 28. Plat. Phaidr. 230, d is cited above, p. 25; v. also Jowett and Campbell, Rep., II p. 247. Compare also the species of poetical personification seen in *φιλεῖν* when the latter is used with abstract subjects in the derived sense of 'be wont, be accustomed'. This use has been adopted from the poets by Hdt., Thuk., and Plat., and is admitted several times by Isokr. in his later writings. E. g. Th. 3, 42, 1 τὸ μὲν (τάχος) μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι; 2, 62, 3, et al., v. Classen on 1, 78, 2 and Merriam on Hdt. 6, 27, 1; Isokr. 6, 104 αἱ λαμπρότητες ἐκ τῶν ἀγῶνων γίγνεσθαι φιλοῦσι; 15, 134. Cf. *ἐθέλειν* in a similar sense in Hdt. and in Th. 2, 89 f.

Especially bold are those personifications by which inanimate things are represented as living, growing old, dying, or being

(l) Verbs of
Dying,
Growing Old. carried to the grave (*ἐνδαιτᾶσθαι*, *ἐγγηράσκειν*, *ἀποθνήσκειν*, *θάπτεσθαι*, etc.) E. g. Th. 2, 43, 3 ἄγραφος μνήμη παρ' ἐκάστῳ ἐνδαιτᾶται; cf. Xen. Kyr. 8, 7, 23 ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ ζῆν τὰ ὑμέτερα ἔργα; Th. 6, 18, 6 πάντων τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐγγηράσεσθαι; Dein. 2, 3 f.; cf. the adjective *ἀγήρατος* in the metaphorical meaning 'eternally young, imperishable': [Lys.] 2, 79 ἀγήρατοι αὐτῶν αἱ μνῆμαι; Hyp. 6, 42 εὐδοξίαν ἀ.; frg. 221; cf. Th. 2, 44 f. τὸ φιλότιμον ἀ. μόνον; 2, 43 ἀ. ἐπαινον; for the poets, v. Hense, p. 271.—Isokr. Ep. 8. 5 πεφύκασιν αἱ περὶ τὴν ῥώμην δυνάμεις συν- ἀποθνήσκειν τοῖς σώμασιν; [Lys.] 2, 60 ὥς συγκαταθαπτομένης τῆς αὐτῶν

ἐλευθερίας τῇ τούτων ἀρετῇ; Lyk. 50 συνετάφη τοῖς τούτων σώμασιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερία, cf. [Demad.] 13; Aisch. 3, 152; 2, 34 προοίμιον σκοτεινὸν καὶ τεθνηκὸς δειλία, cf. Aischyl. Cho. 845 λόγοι θνήσκοντες μάτην; Ant. 5, 95 ἡ τιμωρία ἀπόλωλεν, cf. Hom. I 413 ὄλετο μὲν μοι νόστος, ib. 415 ὄλετό μοι κλέος. A bold antithesis is found in Dem. 19, 289 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ δέδοικα εἰ Φίλιππος ζῇ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῆς πόλεως τέθνηκε τὸ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μισεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι (cf. [Dem.] 43, 60). The reader is in part prepared for this startling turn by the preceding context (περιερχόμεθ' . . . ὠτακουστοῦντες, ποῖ πάρεισι Φίλιππος, ζῇ ἢ τέθνηκεν); otherwise the metaphor would be excessively harsh, as Hermogenes notices, Sp. II p. 367; cf. Blass, III¹ 166. For the adjectives ἀθάνατος and θνητός with abstract terms, v. Roschatt, l. l., p. 43, and for examples in the poets, Hense, p. 280 f.

Many adjectives that are strictly applicable only to persons are sometimes transferred to lifeless things. A few examples of this use may be cited. To such adjectives belong

(m) **Personifying** ἀδελφός, αἷτιος, ἀντίπαλος, ἰσχυρός, κρείττων, κύριος, **Adjectives.** πρόθυμος, σωτήριος, ὑπεύθυνος. E. g. Isokr. 4, 71 ἀδελφὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ἔπραξαν, 'deeds twin with those above mentioned, akin to them', v. Schneider's note; 10, 23 ἀ. τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔσχον, 'they cherished kindred desires'; Hyp. 6, 35; [Lys.] 2, 64; Plat. Phaid. 108, b; for the poets, cf. Hense, p. 225;—Ant. 3, 8, 9 οὐχ ἡμεῖς αἷτιοι, ἀλλ' ἡ πρᾶξις τῶν ἔργων;—Markellinos, Vit. Thuk. 53, after stating that Thuk. often treats passions and things as agents, cites as an example τὸ ἀντίπαλον δέος, 3, 11, 1, 'rival fear, fear that is equally matched';—Ant. 5, 87 (ἰσχυρός); 6, 3;—Ant. 5, 25 κρείσσον ἦν τὸ ἀληθές τῆς τούτων αἰτιάσεως; 5, 12. 73; And. 1, 30;—Isai. 1, 43 f. κυριωτέραν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὀργὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν ποιήσετε; Lys. 1, 36;—Lys. 12, 98 (ἱερὰ) καὶ τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν σωτήρια γίγνεται; Th. 3, 53, 3;—Th. 3, 43, 4 ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἔχοντες πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀκρόασιν; for σύμμαχος, v. p. 42, and for πρόθυμος, p. 48.

Related to the use of abstracts as subjects is their use with ὑπό after passive verbs and intransitives in a passive sense. ὑπό here replaces the simple dative, ἐκ and παρά with the ὑπό with Non-
Personal Words. gen., or διά with the acc. This use occurs freely in Lys., Isai. and Dem., is remarkably frequent in Ant., Thuk. and Isokr. (rhetorical works), and is very rare in And. and the forensic speeches of Isokr. With non-personal words the dative or διά remains the more usual form in Dem., ὑπό is more usual in Isokr. The verbs which most commonly

have *ὑπό* of things are such as ἀναγκάζομαι, πείθομαι, προάγομαι, κρατοῦμαι, διαφθείρομαι, βλάπτομαι, διάκειμαι, πάσχω. Isai. has only πείθομαι, διετίθην, διαφθείρομαι, Lys. only ἀναγκάζομαι, ἐπαίρομαι, διάκειμαι (διετίθην), ἡττώμαι. *ὑπό* in this use is often termed causal, but it expresses as a rule something more than the moving cause of an action; the notion of agency is often clearly present. Prof. Gildersleeve, in the review of Hickie, A. J. P., VI 488, says of this use: '*ὑπό* with a thing personifies it, and to that extent gives a certain poetical color, a certain imaginative light. Any author may on occasion be guilty of this personification or semi-personification. . . . And so the best of the Greeks use *ὑπό* when it suits them'. Marchant has shown (Class. Rev., V 260) that when the verb is in the perfect passive, 'this personification of the inanimate agent' is regularly limited to cases where the subject of the verb is personal. The same scholar in his very complete note on Th. 2, 47, 4 writes: 'The things so used must be such as can be easily personified, such as (1) *natural phenomena*, as χειμών, (2) *external circumstances*, as συμφορά, (3) *emotions*, as ἡδονή, (4) *words which imply a person*, as λόγοι, and all the topics of rhetoric'. For *ὑπό* with the genitive of an abstract in the poets giving only the circumstances 'under which' the action takes place and often parallel with the prose μετά, see Wilamowitz-Moellendorf on Eur. H. F. 289 and Jebb on Soph. Tr. 419.

The dative and διὰ with the acc. are always alternate constructions, as may be seen from the following examples: Gorg. 'Ελ. 20 εἴτε λόγῳ πεισθεῖσα εἴτε ὑπὸ θείας ἀνάγκης ἀναγκασθεῖσα; Ant. 4, γ, 5 ὑπ' ἀθεραπείας διαφθαρήναι, and ib. β, 6 τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ἀβουλίᾳ διέφθαρται; Lys. 7, 14 ὑπὸ πενίας ἠναγκάσθην and Isai. 12, 2 διὰ πενίαν ἀναγκαζομένους; Isokr. 5, 40 ὠμαλισμένas ὑπὸ τῶν συμφορῶν, and 6, 65 ὠμαλισμένοι ταῖς συμφοραῖς.—The following may serve as typical examples of semi-personification with *ὑπό* in the loftier oratorical style: Lys. 32, 18 οὕτω διετέθημεν ὑπὸ τῶν τούτῳ πεπραγμένων καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐκείνης; Isai. 2, 20 οὐχ ὑπ' ἐκείνης (sc. τῆς γυναικός), . . . ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐρημίας ἐπέισθη; Dem. 8, 71 προήχθη οὐθ' ὑπὸ κέρδους οὐθ' ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας; 18, 213 διαρπασθησόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου, 2, 26. 18, 145 (Blass does not seem justified in deleting this phrase in 18, 213); cf. 19, 61 τὰ δόγματα, ὑφ' ὧν καθέλλον αὐτῶν τὰ τείχη; 23, 186 ὑφ' ὑμετέρου ψηφίσματος φυλαττόμενον; 19, 279 ἠλέγχθησαν ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, ib. 101. 37, 25; Aisch. 1, 90 καταμεμαρτυρημένος ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.

CLASS IV.

PERIPHRAISIS.

The cases remain in which the name of an action or abstract quality belonging to a person is placed as subject instead of the person simply, e.g., 'Be on your guard that Aischines' effrontery does not deceive you', instead of 'Be on your guard that Aischines does not deceive you through his effrontery'. This construction is evidently only a particular case of the rhetorical figure *περίφρασις*. Such constructions, as the Greek rhetoricians notice, belong originally to poetical language (Alex. ap. Sp. III 32), and are used in prose chiefly in forcible appeals to the passions, or in the more ornate and elevated style (Tib. ap. Sp. III 75 *κόσμου ἔνεκα ἢ πάθους ἢ μεγαλοπρεπείας*; Cornific. 4, 43 f.; Quintil. 8, 6, 59); v. also Volkmann, l.l., p. 436; Straub, l.l., p. 22; Gerber, l.l., II 45, 255 f. Such periphrases are found in familiar use as early as Homer, e. g. *βίη Ἡρακλῆος, μένος Ἀλκινόοιο* (v. Seymour, Homeric Lang. § 2, s., Kühner-Gerth, II¹ p. 280) and their effect is evidently to personify and to place in the strongest relief some especially characteristic quality of the individual. Hence they either belong to the language of invective, eulogy and earnest appeal, or serve the purposes of rhetorical embellishment. Nägelsbach in his discussion of this subject (l.l., p. 575) points out the difference to be noted here between the classical and the modern idiom; in many of these cases, if the active voice is to be retained, it becomes necessary to employ a personal subject in English, and to render the Greek abstract subject by a prepositional phrase; on the Latin use of these periphrases, v. also Riemann, *Études sur Tite-Live*, p. 71 ff.; Meyer, l.l., p. 25 ff.

Periphrases are especially frequent in expressions of accusation or reproach, and occur with *ὑβρις*, *πονηρία*, *πολυπραγμοσύνη*, *κολακεία*,

(1) Use in *ψευδολογία*, *ἀναίδεια*, *δαροδοκία*, *ἀπόνοια*, *αἰσχροκέρδεια*,
 Invective. *ἀνοια*, *ἀπραγμοσύνη*, *κακία*. The rhetorical use of this figure is especially characteristic of Isokr. E. g.

Dem. 19, 78 *ἡ τοῦτου ψευδολογία αὐτοὺς ἀπώλεσεν, ἐξαπατήσασα ὑμᾶς*. We commonly translate: 'Aischines by his lying reports deceived you and destroyed them'; the periphrasis gives a keener sting to the taunt. Isokr. 14, 16 *ὅπως μὴ τοὺς πρότερον μισοῦντας ἡ τούτων ὑβρις διαλλάξει*, 'There is danger that these men by their arrogant conduct will reconcile to the Lacedaemonians those who formerly

hated them'; Th. 1, 69, 5 αἱ γε ὑμέτεραι ἐλπίδες ἤδη τινάς που ἔφθειραν, 'You have ruined many ere now through the hopes which you have excited'; Hyp. 1, col. 7 ἡ σὴ ἀπόνοια, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ὑπὲρ πάντων τῶν ἀδικούντων προκινδυνεύει, 'In your madness you undertake the defence of all criminals'; cf. Lys. 32, 23 ἡγούμενος δεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πονηρίαν κληρονόμον εἶναι τῶν τοῦ τεθνεώτος χρημάτων ('The passionate tone justifies the personification'. Frohbg.). Often the passive turn may be employed in English: Dem. 36, 61 μὴδ' ὑμᾶς ἡ τοῦτου κραυγὴ καὶ ἀναίδεια ἐξαπατήσῃ, 'Do not allow yourselves to be deceived by the effrontery and the clamor of the accused'. In the expression of irony the abstract subject is as natural in English as in Greek: Th. 6, 17, 1 καὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἐμὴ νεότης καὶ ἀνοία . . . ὠμίλησε καὶ ἔπεισε, 'Thus did my youth and supposed folly confront the Peloponnesian powers and conciliate them'. See also Dem. 18, 218; 19, 288; 25, 101; Isokr. 18, 17; 8, 108; Ep. 4, 7; Aisch. 3, 156; Dein. 1, 108; Th. 6, 18, 6; 3, 61, 1. Finally, the periphrasis is often similarly used in other cases than the nominative, as in the much admired invective of Dem. against Meidias: 21, 96 καὶ ταῦτα πέπονθεν ὑπὸ Μειδίου καὶ τοῦ Μειδίου πλούτου καὶ τῆς ὑπερηφανίας (v. Apsinos ap. Sp. I 2, p. 328), cf. 18, 249; 18, 212; 19, 335; 21, 20; Aisch. 3, 58; Dein. 1, 22, 41; [Lys.] 2, 74; Ant. 4, 8, 7; 3, γ, 3 εἰς τὸν ὑμέτερον ἔλεον καταπεφευγώς.

The periphrasis is usual also in the language of praise and ἀρετὴ is an especially frequent subject in eulogies. In the case

(2) *Eulogy.* of the dead who can no longer act through the common operations of life, it is often natural to represent their former deeds as acting in their place. E. g. Th. 2, 42, 2 ἃ τὴν πόλιν ὕμνησα, αἱ τῶνδε ἀρεταὶ ἐκόσμησαν, 'Their virtues have made the city glorious in the particulars which I have commended'; 4, 81, 2 ἡ Βρασίδου ἀρετὴ καὶ ξύνεσις ἐνθυμίαν ἐνεποιεῖ, i. e. 'the memory of Brasidas' honesty and ability'; [Lys.] 2, 2, 57 (ἡ τούτων ἀρετῇ); And. 1, 107; Th. 3, 56; cf. Lys. 14, 18 ἡμᾶς δὲ μὴδὲν ἂν δύνασθαι παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐξαιτήσασθαι μὴδ' ἂν τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀρετάς, 'On account of their misdeeds not even our ancestors' services to Greece would have won us the leniency of our enemies'; cf. Dem. 18, 93. 222. 317 (ἡ ἐμὴ πολιτεία).

The periphrasis expresses strong feeling of various kinds, such as earnest entreaty, pathos,¹ and the like, or serves to give pointed

¹ Striking instances of this use occur as early as Homer, e. g. M 46 ἀγνορίῃ δέ μιν (sc. λέοντα) ἔκτα; Π 753; Z 407 δαιμόνιε, φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένος; cf. Soph. Ant. 875 σὲ δ' αὐτόγνωτος ὤλεσ' ὀργά.

expression to some antithesis. E. g. Th. 3, 14, 2 γίγνεσθε δὲ ἄνδρες (3) Pathos, etc. οἷουσπερ ὑμᾶς τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος βούλεται, 'Show yourselves such men as we in our fear would have you'; Isai. 2, 12 ὅτι δέοιτο ἢ τε ἡλικία καὶ ἡ ἐρημία ἐκείνου τοῦ θεραπεύοντος αὐτόν, 'On account of his age and bereavement he stood in need of some one to care for him'; Isokr. 5, 149 (τὸ γῆρας); cf. Lys. 12, 14 πρόθυμον παράσχου τὴν σεαυτοῦ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν σωτηρίαν, 'Give me loyally all the assistance in your power'; Frohbg. and Blass (I 408) justify the personification as a faithful imitation of natural language in a moment of passion and terror.—These periphrases must often, however, be considered in close connection with the context in which they occur. They often serve as a means to lend weight to a single word, or to give distinctness to an antithesis which might otherwise seem weak or obscure. Hence their use is not to be attributed so much to the desire to round off the period as to the wish to give force and energy to the expression. E. g. Th. 1, 68, 1 τὸ πιστὸν ὑμᾶς τῆς πολιτείας ἀπιστοτέρους ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους καθίστησι, 'Your own trustworthiness makes you distrustful of others'; 1, 36, 1 (τὸ δεδιός); Lys. 25, 21 (τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἁμαρτήματα); And. 1, 107; Isokr. Ep. 4, 7.

A euphemism belonging to the language of advocates is the periphrasis with ὀργή used of the judges. The speaker is not willing to admit that the jurors have condemned an associate from deliberate conviction, but ascribes their action to a sudden outburst of prejudice. This stereotyped phrase of the orators is in thorough keeping with the picture of the irascible juror which Aristophanes has drawn in the Wasps (v. 999 ff.). E. g. Lys. 29, 6 ἐπειδὴ ἐώρων τὴν ὑμετέραν ὀργὴν τιμωρεῖσθαι βουλομένην, ἡσυχίαν ἔγον, 'They saw that in your anger (here of 'righteous indignation') you were resolved to inflict the penalty of the law.' Here Scheibe and v. Herw. correct to βουλομένων, and Blass (I 408) approves of this correction, but the uses of βούλεσθαι cited above (p. 43), other vigorous periphrases occurring in Lys. (p. 47) and the idiomatic use of ὀργή all favor the MS. reading.—Lys. 25, 5 τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους ὀργὴν ἱκανὴν εἶναι . . . ἀπολέσαι; Dem. 37, 47 ἡ ὀργὴ παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν τούτου κατεψηφίσατο.

In other cases periphrases are employed for rhetorical fullness of expression, sometimes for more precise definition. Such periphrases occur with πράγματα, δύναμις, ἐπιμέλεια, ἐπικουρία, τὸ εὐμενές, φύσις, ἦθος, ὄνομα, τὸ συμφέρον, σωτηρία, εὐνοία. E. g. Th. 1, 110, 1 οὕτω τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων

(5) Rhetorical Ornament.

πράγματα ἐφθάρη ἐξ ἑτῆ πολεμήσαντα, for the constructio ad sensum cf. Pind. Pyth. 1, 72 ὁ Τυρσανῶν ἀλαλατὸς . . . ἰδὼν; Isokr. 8, 137 ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἐφεδρεύουσιν τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἡμετέραν; Lyk. 92 τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἐπιμέλειαν πάσας τὰς ἀνθρωπίνους πράξεις ἐπισκοπεῖν; id. 129; Dem. 4, 45; 6, 24; 20, 13. 69; Aisch. 2, 183 f.; Hyp. 1, col. 34; 6, 42. The heaping up of periphrases belongs to passionate and vehement protestations of an almost dithyrambic character; Dem. 18, 298 ἐμὲ οὔτε καιρὸς οὔτε φιλανθρωπία λόγων οὐτ' ἐπαγγελιῶν μέγεθος οὐτ' ἐλπίς οὔτε φόβος οὐτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐπῆρεν (τῶν) συμφερόντων οὐδὲν προδοῦναι, 'As for me, neither opportunity nor fair spoken words nor swelling promises nor hope nor fear nor any other power could turn me aside from what I judged the interests of my country'; ib. 303; Aisch. 3, 7; Hyp. 6, 25.—From its frequent use as a periphrasis φύσις often comes to stand alone for the person. E. g. Isokr. 9, 49 τοιαύτης φύσεως, ὅς . . .; 20, 11 αὗται αἱ φύσεις εἰσὶν αἱ παραδοῦσαι μὲν τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἡμετέραν, κατασκάψασαι δὲ τὰ τείχη; 4, 113; Aisch. 3, 147 f. See Schneider on Isokr. 7, 74, Stallbaum on Plat. Symp. 191, a, Jowett and Campbell, Rep. II, p. 320, Kühner-Gerth II¹ p. 281.

PASSAGES TEXTUALLY DISCUSSED.

<p>Dem. 16, 21.....28 18, 213.....45 24, 57.....16 Isokr. 9, 22.....42 Lys. 21, 8.....13</p>	<p>Lys. 29, 6.....48 Plat. Rep. 484, a.....20 Thuk. 2, 36, 3.....32 4, 100, 1.....13 5, 65, 2.....43</p>
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LIFE.

Robert Somerville Radford was born in Bedford County, Virginia, January 31, 1869. His preliminary education was received at Bellevue High School, Virginia. In the autumn of 1886 he entered the University of Virginia, from which he was graduated with the degree of Ph. B. in 1889 and of A. M. in 1892. During the years 1889-92 he was instructor in Latin and Greek in the University of Virginia. He also pursued graduate work in Latin and Greek under Professors Wm. E. Peters and M. W. Humphreys, to both of whom he desires to express his sense of indebtedness for personal interest and scholarly instruction in the classics. During the years 1893-95 he was a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins University, making Greek his principal and Latin and Sanskrit his subordinate subjects. He attended the lectures of Professors Gildersleeve, Warren, Bloomfield and Miller, to all of whom he desires to make grateful acknowledgment, and especially to Prof. Gildersleeve for his kindly interest and encouragement and for the unfailing inspiration of his teaching.



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